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ABSTRACT 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PSYCHOPATHY TO 
DIFFERENT TYPES OF EMPATHETIC DEFICITS 
 
Name: Gretak, Alyssa Paige 
University of Dayton 
Advisor: Dr. Catherine Lutz-Zois 
The present study examined the relationship between the constructs of psychopathy and 
empathy in 180 undergraduate students. This study addressed discrepancies in previous 
research concerning these constructs (Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1997; Lishner, 2012).  
Assessing different types of psychopathy and empathy did this, as participants completed 
measures of primary and secondary psychopathy, implicit and explicit cognitive and 
affective empathy, social desirability, and anxiety. Analyses did not support the part of 
Hypothesis 1, stating that primary psychopathy would be positively related to explicit 
cognitive empathy, as a negative association was found. However, as hypothesized, 
primary psychopathy was unrelated to implicit cognitive empathy. Further mixed results 
were yielded for Hypothesis 2, that secondary psychopathy would be negatively related 
to both implicit and explicit cognitive empathy, as a significant negative interaction was 
found only for secondary psychopathy and implicit cognitive empathy. Finally, when    
looking at the use of implicit affective physiological measurements, the current study 
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found secondary psychopathy to be significantly negatively related to implicit affective 
empathy while there was no relation between primary psychopathy and implicit affective 
empathy. Limitations, directions, and implications for future research of these mixed 
results are discussed.    
 
Keywords: primary psychopathy, secondary psychopathy, implicit empathy, affective 
empathy.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Psychopathy is characterized as a pattern of disregard for others and their rights 
that begins early in life and continues through adulthood (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Although other categorization systems have been proposed, one of 
the most common and well-accepted distinctions in the literature is between primary and 
secondary psychopathy (Karpman, 1941; Skeem, et al., 2003). Primary psychopathy is 
often what one thinks when hearing the word “psychopath,” as individuals high in 
primary psychopathic attributes are often calculating and indifferent to the feelings and 
needs of others. In contrast, those high in secondary psychopathic attributes are thought 
to display an anxious, impulsive temperament with a disposition to lie and steal 
(Karpman, 1941; Vidal, Skeem, & Camp, 2010).  
Due to the significant role that empathy plays in psychopathy, a multitude of 
research has examined the relationship between these two variables. Similar to 
psychopathy, the construct of empathy is thought to be multidimensional in nature. While 
there are other models of empathy, the distinction between cognitive and affective 
empathy is relevant to this study. Affective empathy is an emotional experience of an 
individual in response to the emotional reaction of another (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). 
Cognitive empathy, however, is the ability of an individual to mentally recognize the 
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emotions of others without actually experiencing these emotions (Wait & Tiliopoulos, 
2006). Another distinction often made in the empathy literature is between explicit and 
implicit empathy. Explicit empathy is the deliberate and conscious processing of an 
individual and is typically assessed by self-report measures. Implicit empathy is the 
spontaneous, effortless, and unconscious reaction of individuals to emotional situations or 
others’ emotions.  
 The proposed study builds directly from the work of Glaser and Lutz-Zois (2014), 
who attempted to predict participants’ standing on implicit cognitive, explicit affective 
and explicit cognitive empathy from their scores on primary and secondary psychopathy 
measures. Glaser and Lutz-Zois (2014) reported that those with primary psychopathic 
tendencies reported no less empathy than those without psychopathic tendencies. 
Individuals displaying secondary psychopathic tendencies scored lower on measures of 
empathy than did primary psychopathic and pathology free counterparts (Glaser & Lutz-
Zois, 2014). Using the methods of Glaser and Lutz-Zois (2014), with the addition of an 
implicit affective empathy measure (i.e., heart rate), the current study tests the hypotheses 
that primary psychopathy will be uncorrelated to implicit measures of cognitive empathy 
and positively related to explicit measures of cognitive empathy. In contrast, it is 
hypothesized that primary psychopathy will be negatively related to implicit measures of 
affective empathy. Finally, it is expected that secondary psychopathic attributes will be 
negatively correlated with all empathy measures.  
Psychopathy 
 While Cleckley (1964) originally conceptualized psychopathy as we are familiar 
with it today, this interpersonal pattern has been adjusted countless times over the past 
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several centuries. A student of Aristotle describes “The Unscrupulous Man,” which 
depicts our current conceptualization of an antisocial individual in terms of interpersonal 
inappropriateness and impulsivity (Millon, Simonsen, & Birket-Smith, 1998). In the late 
18th to early19th centuries, researchers continue to be puzzled by individuals who display 
psychopathic tendencies. Phillippe Pinel referred to this “madness” as “la folie 
raisonnate” and described such patients as impulsive and self-destructive, but also able to 
retain reasoning abilities and to grasp the irrationality of their behavior (Millon et al., 
1998). Many ideas surfaced throughout the centuries of what to call this “madness.” Emil 
Kraepelin labeled individuals who suffered from the inability to restrain themselves from 
impulsivity in socially undesirable ways as “morally insane” (Millon et al., 1998). 
Throughout history, research has provided a strong foundation for the current literature, 
and the ever-evolving field of psychopathy.  
Currently, psychopathy is defined in terms of a collection of affective, 
interpersonal, and behavioral characteristics. These characteristics include, but are not 
limited to, impulsivity, lack of empathy and guilt, pathological lying, and 
manipulativeness (Hare, 1996). Hare (2003) more recently goes on to describe 
individuals with psychopathy as being interpersonally charming, but affectively shallow 
and prone to commit a variety of antisocial acts. Likewise, Hakkanen-Nyholm and 
Nyholm (2012) describe individuals with psychopathy as convincing, charming, and able 
to act without a sense of emotion while manipulating another individual for their own 
personal benefit. Hare (2003) describes individuals with psychopathic tendencies to be 
lacking in conscience and feelings for others, while regularly violating social norms 
without a sense of guilt, and leading impulsive and parasitic lifestyles.  
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Psychopathy has become closely affiliated with personality disorders, specifically 
those in Cluster B personality disorders. According to the DSM 5 (2013) a personality 
disorder is an enduring characteristic of an individual in which his or her behavior goes 
against the social norms, is pervasive and inflexible, and is stable over time therefore 
leading to distress or impairment in daily life. The Cluster B personality disorders include 
antisocial, borderline, histrionic, and narcissistic personality disorders, each of which 
causes an individual to appear dramatic, emotional, or erratic (APA, 2013). The 
characteristics of manipulation and a lack of empathy that Cleckley (1964) used to define 
psychopathy are found in narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) and borderline 
personality disorder (BPD). Features of secondary psychopathy, such as impulsivity and 
aggression, can be found in the diagnostic criteria for BPD, as well (APA, 2013). 
Antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) has often been compared to psychopathy, 
as both include the central feature of a pattern of disregard for others and their rights. For 
instance, the diagnosis of ASPD requires that the pattern of disregard, which is 
characteristic of psychopathy, be present in an individual since the age of 15. The criteria 
also include specific disregard and violations of others, as well as an age criteria of 18 
years or older for diagnosis (APA, 2013). That is, the specific set of criteria in the DSM 5 
for ASPD are behavioral in features, such as irritability and aggressiveness indicated by 
physical fights or assault and consistent irresponsibility (e.g., failure to sustain work or 
honor financial obligations; APA, 2013). Features of psychopathy however, include more 
interpersonal features such as the manipulation of others or lack of empathy. Due to these 
additional behavioral criteria for ASPD, an individual high in psychopathy may not 
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necessarily be diagnosed with ASPD, as they may never fulfill specified, behaviorally 
based criteria.  
Society often assumes that persons exhibiting high levels of psychopathy are 
primarily present in clinical or forensic populations. It has been noted, however, that 
some individuals with these psychopathic, antisocial tendencies operate in mainstream 
society and learn to demonstrate their characteristics in socially acceptable ways (Millon, 
1981). Salekin, Trobst, and Krioukova (2001) sought to observe how prevalent the 
construct of psychopathy was in non-forensic settings. As the two dimensions of 
psychopathy (primary and secondary) are continuous, psychopathic tendencies can be 
found in the community, specifically college samples, at a higher rate than expected 
(Board & Fritzon, 2005; Mullins-Nelson, Salekin & Leistico, 2006). This supports the 
rationale for using a college sample for the current study.  
Primary and Secondary Psychopathy  
 Research has recently indicated several ways to distinguish psychopathy types, 
and while previous systems have been proposed, primary and secondary variants of 
psychopathy are most commonly examined and are the focus of the current study 
(Karpman, 1941; Poythress & Skeem, 2006; Skeem & Poythress, 2003). Primary and 
secondary psychopathy are both categorized by the likeliness to act irresponsible, hostile, 
or in an antisocial fashion (Karpman, 1948b). The distinctions between these two 
categories of psychopathy are often based on the etiology of, and motivation for, the 
psychopathic behavior of the individual (Karpman, 1941; Porter, 1996). For example, 
traits of a “primary psychopath” are thought to be rooted in inherent deficits (e.g., lack of 
positive emotions) within the individual, and could not be attributed to psychosocial 
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factors (Karpman, 1941). Karpman (1948b) suggested that features of the secondary 
psychopath are due to environmental influences that cause a character fixation, such as 
negative family influence. Karpman (1941) made the initial distinction between primary 
and secondary psychopathy in relation to susceptibility to negative emotions. He stated 
that those with primary psychopathic traits demonstrate the absence of a conscience and 
are essentially unable to experience emotions like anxiety, empathy, or guilt (Blackburn, 
1975). Individuals with secondary psychopathic traits however, have a conscience, but it 
is disrupted due to the hostility created by an anxious and emotional disposition, and is 
often expressed through aggressive behaviors as there is increased impulsivity present 
(Blackburn, 1975). Individuals with secondary psychopathy are therefore prone to 
experience these human emotions including guilt, depression, and anxiety but it may not 
be evident based on their behavior (Karpman 1941).  
More recently Fowles & Dindo (2006) proposed a Dual Deficit Model of 
psychopathy in which inherent deficits may not be the only explanation for the different 
traits between psychopathy subtypes. The model highlights the potential role that 
biological or neurological mechanisms play in the differences found between primary and 
secondary psychopathy. Fowles & Dindo (2006) suggest that individuals with primary 
psychopathy have reduced fear sensitivity, which would explain why these individuals 
are often calm in the presence of danger or exciting stimuli. The deficit makes an 
individual with primary psychopathy more prone to risky and sensation-seeking 
behaviors, as they are less likely than others to experience emotional exhilaration at lower 
levels of stimulation. This model also suggests that individuals with traits of secondary 
psychopathy could be experiencing executive functioning deficits. This would point to a 
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deficit in the employment of cognitive strategies to control their behavior (i.e., planning 
and focus). This supports the distinction made between the subtypes of psychopathy in 
that the model suggests that individuals with traits of secondary psychopathy experience 
impulse control problems more so than those with primary psychopathy (Fowles & 
Dindo, 2006). Secondary psychopathy has been suggested to be the result of 
environmental causes such as parental abuse or harsh punishment; therefore, it is thought 
to be an acquired disturbance that is not inherent within the individual (Karpman, 1941; 
Poythress & Skeem, 2006).   
Karpman (1948) suggested that those with secondary psychopathy exhibit an 
underlying emotional disorder that influences an individual’s antisocial behavior. As 
noted, this emotional disorder likely stems from the developmental precursors such as 
parental neglect, abuse, or harshness. Karpman (1948b) also suggests that the differences 
between primary and secondary psychopathy are crucial due to the treatments for each. 
While lack of empathy, or empathetic dysfunction, is considered a defining characteristic 
of psychopathy, theoretically this lack is most associated with primary psychopathy 
(Blair, 2007). Because of the suggested deficits in primary psychopathy, Karpman 
(1948b) thought individuals with primary psychopathy to be incurable. Due to the 
psychosocial influence on the development of secondary psychopathy, it was suggested 
that these individuals would be more likely to respond to psychotherapy than those high 
is primary psychopathy (Karpman, 1948b).  
Karpman’s view of primary psychopathy has been noted to align closely with 
Cleckley’s original concept of psychopathy, which stated that callous/unemotional traits 
define psychopathy (Lykken, 1995; Murphy & Vess, 2003). While a lack of empathy, or 
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empathetic dysfunction, is considered a defining characteristic of psychopathy, this 
deficit, as well as traits such as insincerity and incapacity for love, are most associated 
with primary psychopathy (Blair, 2007). Cleckley (1964) further describes an individual 
with psychopathy as having antisocial traits that include poor judgment, uninviting 
behavior (such as lying), and criminal behavior. However, as will be discussed in more 
detail, research suggests that those with secondary psychopathy have more difficulty 
correctly recognizing the emotions of others when compared to those with primary 
psychopathy (Grieve & Mahar, 2010).  
Empathy 
 Empathy is often difficult to define in an all-encompassing fashion. It is 
commonly defined as an emotional response that is experienced by an individual in 
response to the emotion of another (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990); however, this definition 
highlights an affective type of empathy. The overall construct of empathy has been 
discussed as multidimensional and can be divided into many sub-categories, of concern 
in the current study is the distinction between cognitive and affective empathy and 
explicit and implicit empathy (Mullins-Nelson, Salekin, & Leistico, 2006). Cognitive 
empathy is defined as the ability to recognize the emotional states of others without 
actually experiencing the states for oneself (Wai & Tiliopoulos, 2006). This form of 
empathy requires the individual to be able to recognize emotion and to differentiate the 
affective cues of another, but does not necessitate an empathic response (Mullins-Nelson 
et al., 2006). For example, individuals can differentiate between cues that signal positive 
affect such as smiling, and cues that signal negative affect such as frowning. Also 
included in cognitive empathy is perspective taking, in which an individual can 
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understand why a person is expressing a specific affective cue and emotion (e.g., 
happiness due to getting a desired gift; crying because someone has been hurt) (Mullins-
Nelson et al., 2006).  
Similar to cognitive empathy, affective empathy requires an individual to first 
recognize the emotional state of another (Reniers, Corcoran, Drake, Shryane, & Vollm, 
2011). However, in contrast to cognitive empathy, the person also experiences an 
emotional response to another’s emotions (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Wait & Tiliopoulos, 
2006). In other words, affective empathy is not about only recognizing the emotions of 
another, but feeling something oneself when the emotion is recognized. This can lead to 
empathic concern and personal distress for an individual. 
Another distinction often made in the empathy literature is between explicit and 
implicit empathy. Explicit empathy involves the deliberate and conscious processing of 
information on the part of an individual and is typically assessed by self-report measures. 
Self-report measures of empathy are often easy and quick to administer, but they also 
allow individuals to answer questions in socially desirable ways (Eisenberg & Fabes, 
1990; Kampfe, Penzhorn, Schikora, Dunzl, & Schneidenback, 2009). It can be 
particularly difficult to use these measures when attempting to gauge empathy reports of 
an individual who has psychopathic tendencies due to the individual’s possible 
inclination toward pathological lying and deception. Thus, people with psychopathic 
traits would be more prone to answer in socially desirable ways instead of honestly on 
self-report measures of empathy (Hare, 1996).  
  Implicit empathy is the spontaneous and unconscious reaction of individuals to 
emotional situations or others’ emotions. Physiological indices are often used to measure 
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implicit empathy (affectively), as they are less likely to elicit a self-presentational bias 
from individuals because it is difficult to feign a physiological response. These measures, 
such as measures of heart rate, are used as an indicator of empathetic emotions (e.g., 
affective empathy), and allow researchers to assess changes in those emotions over time 
(Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990). Research indicates that different heart rates can be associated 
with certain emotional reactions to stimuli or situations. For example, a decrease in heart 
rate is associated with a reaction such as sadness, while an increase in heart rate is often 
an indication of an aversive reaction such as anxiety or apprehension that may cause 
personal distress (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1990; Verona, Patrick, Curtin, Bradely, & Lang, 
2004).  
 Affective empathy involves an emotional response such as concern or distress 
(Kerem, Fishman, & Josselson, 2001); therefore researchers studying this construct first 
need to be able to evoke empathy. Batson, Early, and Salavarani (1997) conducted a 
study in which they had undergraduates listen to a pseudo news broadcast. The broadcast 
covered the story of a senior student in her undergraduate studies at a local university 
who had recently experienced tragedy. In this study, one third of participants were told to 
remain objective, one third were told to imagine how the young woman felt, and one 
third were told to imagine how they would feel in her situation while listening to the 
broadcast. This encouraged some of the students to adopt an empathic listening style, 
therefore assessing the situational or contextual influence on the empathetic responses. 
The results suggested that imagining how the other person may feel produced empathy, 
and imagining how you would feel produces empathy, as well as personal distress 
(Batson et al., 1997). The proposed study will use this same broadcast to evoke empathy 
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in participants. In line with the Batson et al., some participants will be asked to adopt an 
empathic listening style in order to address additional research questions beyond the 
study’s primary hypotheses.  
The Relationship between Psychopathy and Empathy 
 As stated previously, lack of empathy is considered to be one of the primary 
features of psychopathy (Cleckley, 1964; Hare, 2003; Lykken, 1995). Only recently, 
however, have the distinctions between primary and secondary psychopathy (Ali, 
Amorim, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010) and cognitive and affective empathy (Kirsch & 
Becker, 2007) been considered. Therefore, much of the research based on the relation of 
psychopathy and empathy has been inconclusive (Mulllins-Nelson, Salekin, & Leistico, 
2006) or yielded mixed results (e.g., Blair, 2007; Domes et al., 2013; Lishner et al., 
2012). There is an important distinction not only between understanding the emotions of 
others (cognitive empathy) and being able to actually feel what another individual is 
feeling (affective empathy), but also the type of psychopathic tendencies a person 
displays. The current study intends to highlight those differences.  
 Vidal et al. (2010) researched the relationship between both primary and 
secondary psychopathy types and emotional skills. Relevant to the current study are two 
of the aims of Vidal et al. The first was to assess the relationships between psychopathy 
type and emotional intelligence, and the second was to compare emotional intelligence of 
low-anxious (primary) and high-anxious (secondary) psychopathy. This study used self-
report measures of psychopathic traits, anxiety, and aggression as well as a performance-
based test of emotional intelligence on a sample of male undergraduates. The emotional 
intelligence test included the branches of perceiving emotions, facilitating thoughts, 
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understanding emotions, and measuring emotions. Vidal et al. found an association 
between primary psychopathy and affective empathy such that those with characteristics 
of primary psychopathy were more likely to demonstrate a deficit in empathy that 
restricts them from experiencing another’s emotion than those without such 
characteristics; however, while those high in primary psychopathy exhibited the basic 
emotional deficit, their ability to recognize, use, and understand emotions (cognitive 
empathy) did not appear to be impaired. Vidal et al. (2010) also found that those in the 
secondary psychopathy group had significantly lower emotional intelligence (cognitive 
empathy) than those with primary psychopathy. The negative affect and impulsivity of 
those with secondary psychopathy could explain the impairment in ability to evaluate and 
learn feelings and regulate emotional states (Vidal et al., 2010). The use of self-report 
measures may help to explain why results revealed the ability to experience cognitive 
empathy, but not affective, for those with primary psychopathic tendencies, as they may 
have learned to recognize an emotion without understanding of it. This learning process 
could provide individuals with the tools needed to respond in a socially desirable, 
although not necessarily honest, fashion. 
Bagley, Abramowitz, and Kosson (2009) studied whether those high in primary or 
secondary psychopathy displayed varying vocal affect recognition deficits (which can 
also be studied as empathy deficits). In order to explain the variability in previous 
research on the topic, they suggested that individuals with psychopathy may experience 
different types of emotional deficits. In addition they suggested that by using different 
methods of looking at this process (vocal affect recognition versus self-report empathy 
measures), it could provide evidence for different types of deficits in affect recognition (a 
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potential component of empathy) (Bagley et al., 2009). Bagley et al. found that those with 
primary or secondary psychopathy were less accurate than participants without 
psychopathic tendencies at classifying emotion in a semantic condition. This means that 
they attempted to understand the emotional impact of the meaning of the words they 
heard. The results also suggested that individuals with both primary and secondary 
psychopathy are similar in their emotional processing deficits such that they are impaired 
at recognizing sadness. Bagley et al. found that participants with psychopathic tendencies 
were unable to comprehend the sadness of the story; therefore evidence of implicit 
affective empathy is not expected for individuals with psychopathy. In addition, Bagley 
et al. suggested that dividing psychopathy into primary and secondary types was useful, 
but research is still needed to examine other affective and cognitive tasks. Therefore, 
categorizing individuals into psychopathy types and measuring implicit and explicit, 
cognitive and affective empathy would be beneficial in this area of research.  
 Lishner et al. (2012) conducted a study in which they examined the relationship 
between psychopathy and impairment in experiencing affective empathy. The researchers 
attempted to manipulate the state experience of empathic concern and emotional 
deviances. This was done in order to avoid respondents’ biased assessments of their own 
experiences. In addition, they tried to measure the states in a way that would lessen the 
motivation to give socially desirable responses. Participants (60 male institutionalized 
forensic inpatients) read two news articles; one was empathy evoking and one neutral, 
and viewed pictures consisting of three everyday objects, three places, and three faces 
that were ranked by participants by category and then by liking. The ranking of image 
preference was done to distract them from the manipulation and measurement of affective 
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empathy. Participants then used self-report means to state their feelings (explicit 
empathy) after reading the articles and viewing the faces. Following the completion of 
the affective empathy tasks, researchers had participants rate each emotion (happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear, and empathetic concern). In contrast to previous research, Lishner et 
al. found no significant correlations between psychopathy scores and affective empathy 
in either college undergraduates or in the forensic inpatient men. In fact, according to 
Lishner et al., the only relation found indicated higher explicit affective empathy in 
individuals with psychopathy. As Vidal et al. (2010) noted, explicit affective empathy 
appeared to be impaired for those with primary psychopathic tendencies (based on 
research using strictly self-report), so it is possible that not differentiating between 
psychopathy types could have affected the results. Further, although Lishner et al. 
attempted to decrease participants’ motivation to answer in socially desirable ways; the 
use of self-report does not entirely eliminate socially desirable responses. This may also 
account for the lack of support for the hypothesis that those with psychopathy lack 
affective empathy.  
As stated above, while lack of empathy, or empathetic dysfunction, is considered 
a defining characteristic of psychopathy, theoretically, this lack is most strongly 
associated with primary psychopathy (Blair, 2007). The inconsistencies in findings that 
support the assumption that a lack of empathy is most strongly associated with primary 
psychopath may be due to the type of measures being used to assess empathy, as well as 
the type of empathy that is being studied. In addition, a lack of attention to the primary 
versus secondary psychopathy distinctions could help explain the conflicting results. 
Individuals with primary psychopathy are described as manipulative and intelligent 
 
 
 
  
15 
 
(Cleckley, 1964). This makes it possible that individuals with traits of primary 
psychopathy respond in socially desirable ways on self-report measures of empathy. 
Further, individuals with primary psychopathy may have an inability to feel emotions as 
others feel them (affective empathy), but over years of experience they may have learned 
how to recognize emotion without understanding it. It may not be an inherent implicit 
ability, but instead a learned ability to “fake it,” in order to compensate for their 
deficiency (Vidal et al., 2010). In other words, individuals with primary psychopathic 
traits are able to participate in perspective taking, and thus will perform well on measures 
of cognitive empathy. However, they will likely still be deficient in affective empathy.   
Additionally, Mullins-Nelson et al. (2006) noted that even though individuals 
high in primary psychopathy may report concern about others and their well-being, their 
behaviors do not tend to match their reported empathetic concern. As Karpman (1948) 
suggested, individuals with secondary psychopathy may be able to experience emotions 
such as empathy. However, research shows that individuals with secondary psychopathic 
traits may actually perform worse on all measures of empathy (implicit, explicit, 
cognitive, and affective). This has been attributed to the conscious disruption that occurs 
in these individuals when they experience emotional dysregulation (Vidal et al., 2010). In 
other words, individuals with secondary psychopathy have lower emotional intelligence; 
therefore they experience a basic emotional disturbance that can impair their ability to 
evaluate and recognize feelings and regulate their emotional state (Vidal et al., 2010).  
In order to address the multiple potential limitation of past research, the current 
study will measure affective empathy, physiologically. Heart rate is a physiological 
measure that is hypothesized to gauge implicit affective empathy (instead of explicit 
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affective empathy) with a lower probability that participants with psychopathic 
tendencies can fake their responses by tapping into their unlearned, unconscious 
reactions. Blair, Jones, Clark, and Smith (1997) avoided the use of self-report measures 
and instead looked to physiological measures, which produced results that conflicted with 
those of Lishner and colleagues. Blair et al. (1997) found that psychopathy was 
associated with a lower physiological reactivity, measured using skin conductance 
response measures, after individuals observed interpersonally distressed images such as 
crying faces. Individuals without, or very low in, psychopathic tendencies often have 
higher physiological reactivity when looking at emotional stimuli, such as an increase in 
heart rate, which can indicate feelings of distress. The low rate of such reactivity found 
by Blair, et al. indicates impairment in individuals with psychopathy when processing 
fearful, sad, or disgusted faces and a potential lack of affective empathy. While this study 
did find results to suggest physiological reactivity is related to psychopathy, there was no 
distinction made between individuals with primary and secondary psychopathic traits. 
The descriptions of the characteristics of primary and secondary psychopathy in the 
literature suggest there should be a difference in physiological measures (implicit 
affective empathy measures), such that the latter scores low on all types of empathy 
(explicit cognitive, implicit cognitive, and implicit affective) and the former scores low 
only on implicit affective empathy.  
 Glaser and Lutz-Zois (2014) aimed to investigate the discrepancy between 
findings and theory by suggesting that the discrepancy in previous research were due to 
the way empathy had been measured. To test this, both implicit and explicit measures of 
empathy were studied in relation to psychopathy. The results of the study yielded no 
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significant correlations between primary psychopathy and any measure of empathy 
(Glaser & Lutz-Zois, 2014). This result is inconsistent with our knowledge of 
psychopathy, as primary psychopathy is characterized by a lack of remorse and 
indifference to others (Karpman, 1941). While Glaser and Lutz-Zois (2014) included 
measures of explicit affective empathy and implicit and explicit cognitive empathy, 
implicit affective empathy was not assessed. Therefore, the current study aims to use the 
methods presented by Glaser and Lutz-Zois (2014) to measure cognitive empathy 
implicitly and explicitly and measure affective empathy explicitly. Additionally, heart 
rate measurements (taken while the participants listen to an empathy evoking stimuli) 
will be used to measure implicit affective empathy in the current study. Implicit affective 
empathy is often overlooked in research, and to my knowledge has not been combined, in 
heart-rate measurement form, with the psychopathy-type distinction. As stated 
previously, individuals high in primary psychopathic attributes often lie, manipulate, and 
demonstrate a lack of remorse. Because of this, socially desirable responses are given and 
low levels of empathy are not reported on explicit cognitive measures (self-reports). 
Individuals high in secondary psychopathic traits may show positive emotion such as 
guilt, which indicates likeliness for more accurate responses, resulting in lower levels of 
empathy than people with primary psychopathic traits. Additionally, persons high in 
primary psychopathic traits are more cunning and less impulsive than those high in 
secondary psychopathic traits, therefore they may be better able to understand and mimic 
normal human emotions (cognitive empathy). A quote by Johns and Quay (1962) aptly 
describes this ability, stating that persons with primary psychopathic attributes may 
“know the words, but not the music” of emotions. Thus, cognitive and explicit measures 
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would be less able to detect the deficits experienced by those high in primary 
psychopathic tendencies. The combination of implicit and affective empathy will be 
measured by a physiological response (heart rate), which is difficult to feign, even for an 
individual high in primary psychopathic traits and well-versed in normal emotions.  
Current Study 
The current study aimed to resolve inconsistencies found in the research on the 
relation between psychopathy and empathy, specifically as it pertains to a lack of 
empathy defined as the primary characteristic of psychopathy. As the constructs of 
psychopathy and empathy have been distinguished into different dimensions (primary 
and secondary, implicit and explicit, cognitive and affective) in recent years, an eminent 
opportunity has been presented for researchers to delve into a deeper understanding of 
psychopathy and empathy on several levels. Previous research has cited significant and 
non-significant relations between psychopathy (both primary and secondary) and 
empathy (implicit, explicit, cognitive, and affective). The current study examined each of 
these constructs simultaneously, such that implicit and explicit cognitive empathy as well 
as implicit affective empathy were measured to best answer the basic question of what 
the relation is between psychopathy and empathy. Further, primary and secondary 
psychopathic tendencies were distinguished from one another to study how the two types 
of psychopathy differ in their relation to the various subtypes of empathy. In addition, the 
current study aimed to implicate implicit affective empathy as the key deficit in the 
relationship between primary psychopathy and empathy.  
Based on previous literature, the hypotheses for the current study are as follows: 
 
 
 
  
19 
 
 H1: Primary psychopathy will be uncorrelated to implicit measures of cognitive 
empathy and positively related to explicit measures of cognitive empathy, such that 
individuals high in primary psychopathic tendencies will score higher on self-report 
measures of cognitive empathy than those low in these attributes. 
 H2: Secondary psychopathy will be negatively related to both implicit and explicit 
measures of cognitive empathy. In other words, individuals with secondary psychopathic 
tendencies will score lower on both implicit and explicit cognitive empathy than those 
low in these attributes.   
H3: Both primary and secondary psychopathy will be negatively related to 
implicit measures of affective empathy. That is, individuals with psychopathic tendencies 
will demonstrate less of a physiological reaction to empathy provoking stimuli, such that 
they will not experience as much of a change in heart rate while listening to the news 
broadcast recording in comparison to those low in psychopathic attributes.  
Research question Do response patterns of individuals with primary and 
secondary psychopathic traits vary in different contexts (created by different listening 
styles)? Batson and colleagues (1997) found that perspective taking has proved effective 
in inducing empathy in a “normal” population as well as for convicted murders. As noted, 
primary psychopathy is thought to be inherent in an individual, while those with traits of 
secondary psychopathy are thought to have the ability to show positive human emotion. 
Therefore, the current study expected to find an effect of context on those with secondary 
psychopathic traits (such that we see evidence of empathy for those with traits of 
secondary psychopathy), but not for those with primary psychopathic traits.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 Undergraduate participants (N = 185; 125 female and 60 male), majority 
freshman (N=63.4%), ranging in age from 17 to 37 years old (M=18.92 year, SD=1.72), 
were recruited using an online computer system. Participants identified as 82.8% 
Caucasian; 5.4% Hispanic; 4.8% African American; 2.7% Asian; 1.6% Middle Eastern; 
and 1.6% multiethnic. Participants received class credit for their participation in the study 
toward an introductory psychology course. 
Materials 
 Implicit affective empathy was induced in participants by using a recorded radio 
broadcast depicting an emotion-laden story. A pilot study ensured the ability of the 
broadcasts to evoke empathy in participants. For the current study, a broadcast originally 
created and used by Batson et al. (1997) was rerecorded. This pseudo broadcast, first 
used at the University of Kansas, features a news story as well as an interview with a 
female student, Katie Banks. In this broadcast, a male reporter narrates Katie’s story of 
being an undergraduate senior, attempting to complete her final year of undergraduate 
studies, while also having been awarded temporary guardianship of her surviving 
younger siblings (a brother and a sister) after a car accident killing her parents and other 
sibling. Katie is struggling both financially and academically and is worried she may not 
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be able to complete her degree while also supporting her siblings. The broadcast 
continued with an interview with the student, further evoking empathy.  
For the current study there were two versions of the broadcast, one in which Katie 
Banks is the student and the announcer is male and another in which a male, named Kyle 
Banks, is the student with a female announcer. The Broadcast was transcribed and a 
script identical to that used by Batson et al. (1997) was rerecorded, replacing the name of 
the university and town to portray the broadcast as coming from the area in which the 
current study takes place. An additional identical script was made for Kyle Banks, only 
switching gender pronouns (i.e., her to his; See appendices A and B for copies of the 
transcripts). Batson et al. (1997) had participants listen to this pseudo broadcast while 
adopting various listening styles and the current study will have a similar method. 
Participants were randomly assigned to conditions in which they were instructed to adopt 
one of the two listening styles:  (1) to imagine how the young student felt, or (2) or 
simply to listen to the broadcast (See appendices C and D for listening style instructions).  
Measures 
 Implicit Affective Empathy. Changes in participants’ heart rate were assessed 
using a Zephyr Bluetooth wireless heart rate sensor. This heart rate sensor included a 
chest strap that was worn under the participants clothing. This sensor wirelessly transmits 
the heart rate measurements to an android or Macintosh-based application that was 
downloaded onto apple or android products (i.e. Smartphone, iPods). Many heart rate 
sensors include a chest strap and wrist strap, however, wrist equipment would have 
required the researcher to approach the participant several times to check the heart rate. 
Using this wireless chest strap, the researcher was able to keep a reasonable distance 
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from the participant, avoiding additional stress induction. This also allowed researchers 
to record data more frequently.  
Researchers recorded the heart rate in 30-second intervals for the five-minute 
baseline task; the two minutes and 30 second broadcast time; and the two-minute rest 
period following the broadcast. When scoring this measure for analysis, residual scores 
were calculated using absolute values. The residual scores were derived from the 
difference between the recorded baseline heart rate intervals from six to ten, and the 
recorded heart rate during the broadcast intervals from two to five. These intervals were 
chosen after examining the means for each interval and finding that the selected intervals 
displayed the most consistency with that set of heart rate measurement intervals (i.e., for 
baseline or for broadcast). Absolute values were used, as the direction of change 
(increase or decrease) in heart rate did not matter as so much as that there was a 
detectable change.  
Implicit Cognitive Empathy.  
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) revised is a 36-item (α=.45) 
implicit measure of cognitive empathy measuring the ability to identify a mental state 
based on viewing only the eye region (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raster, and 
Plumb, 2001). This test includes 36 pictures of the eye region, and the participants are 
given four words that depict complex mental states. The participants then have to choose 
which of the words best describes the pictures (1 target, 3 foils). Correct answers receive 
1 point, and incorrect answers receive 0; therefore, the range of scores is 0 to 36.  
The RMET required that the pictures were viewed by eight judges (four male and 
four female) who were told to complete the task of a participant; choosing a word from a 
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group of target and foil words. In order for the stimulus to be accepted, at least five of the 
eight judges had to agree and no more than two judges could pick a single foil word 
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, and Jolliffe, 1997). This test was used on college students 
who were shown to be able to classify the correct emotion at a significantly greater rate 
than chance. The pictures of only the eyes did not differ from those with the whole face 
for complex emotions. This suggested that emotions could be determined from just the 
eyes (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). Test-retest reliability for the Italian version of the 
RMET-revised was high (.83) (Vellante, et al., 2012). Construct validity of the RMET-
revised is demonstrated in that it is negatively related to the Autism Spectrum Quotient (r 
= -.53), as was expected (considering those with autism are thought to have difficulty in 
reading social cues; Baron-Cohen, et. al., 2001). Further, Vellante and colleagues (2012) 
found internal consistency to be acceptable (r = .61). The RMET revised can be found in 
Appendix E. 
Explicit Affective Empathy 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). The Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI) is a self-report measure consisting of four 7-item subscales that each target an 
aspect of the global empathy constructs (Davis, 1980). The index contains 28-items 
(α=.80) total that are answered on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “Does not describe 
me well” (0) to “Describes me very well” (4). Scores on each subscale range from 0-35, 
with a total score ranging from 0-196. The four subscales are: Perspective Taking, 
Fantasy, Empathic Concern, and Personal Distress (Davis 1980). Fantasy, Empathic 
Concern, and Personal Distress measure explicit affective empathy. The Fantasy Scale 
(FS) includes 7 items (α=.82) and taps into the participants’ tendency to put themselves 
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into the feelings and actions of fictitious characters imaginatively (e.g., “After seeing a 
play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters.”). The Empathetic 
Concern (FC) subscale assesses “other-oriented” feelings for inopportune others (e.g., “I 
often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.”) with 7 items 
(α=.73). The Personal Distress (PD) subscale, including 7 items (α=.76), measures self-
oriented feelings of anxiety and ease in tense settings (e.g., “In emergency situations, I 
feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease.”). For the current study the Empathetic Concern and 
Personal Distress subscale scores were used to test the study’s hypotheses involving 
explicit affective empathy.  
The IRI was found in previous research to demonstrate satisfactory test-retest 
reliability (.71) and internal reliability (.77) (Mullins-Nelson et al., 2006). Davis (1980) 
found, in terms of validity, theoretically predicted patterns of relationships between the 
IRI subscales and other constructs. Specifically, the FS was unrelated to social 
functioning but related to emotionality. EC was related to emotionality as well and PD 
was strongly associated with low self-esteem, poor interpersonal functioning, and 
emotional vulnerability (Davis, 1980). The IRI can be found in Appendix F, with specific 
subscales indicated in parentheses following each item. 
 Explicit Cognitive Empathy.  
 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). Again, the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI) is a self-report measure consisting of four 7-item subscales that 
each target an aspect of the global empathy constructs (Davis, 1980). Scores on each 
subscale range from 0-35, with a total score ranging from 0-196. The four subscales are: 
Perspective Taking, Fantasy, Empathic Concern, and Personal Distress (Davis 1980). The 
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Perspective-Taking (PT) subscale is a cognitive measure of empathy as it assesses the 
tendency to adopt the point of view of others (e.g., “Before criticizing somebody, I try to 
imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.”) and includes 7 items (α=.75). For this 
reason, the Perspective Taking (PT) subscale of the IRI was used to test the hypotheses 
involving explicit cognitive empathy.  
To reiterate, in terms of validity, theoretically predicted patterns of relationships 
have been found between the IRI subscales and other constructs (Davis, 1980). 
Specifically, the PT scale was negatively related to social dysfunction and unrelated to 
emotionality measures. Additional information on the IRI can be found in the previous 
section discussing explicit affective empathy. The IRI can be found in Appendix F with 
subscales indicated in parentheses following the item.  
Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire-Short Form (TEIQue-SF; Petrides & 
Furnham, 2006) is a 30-item (α=.82), self-report subscale of the TEIQue that assesses 
explicit, cognitive empathy. It measures trait emotional intelligence and emotional self-
efficacy. Trait emotional intelligence is described as a hierarchical structure that is 
divided into four factors, containing 15 facets total. These factors include: Emotionality 
(i.e., the ability to recognize and express one’s own emotions and recognize the emotions 
of others), Self-control (i.e., control over one’s urges and desires), Sociability (i.e., social 
relationships and social influence) and Well-being (i.e., positive self-regard). 
Emotionality consists of the facets: Emotion Perception, Trait Empathy, Emotion 
Expression, and Relationships. Emotionality is the most related to cognitive empathy and 
the least likely to create an overlap in content with the measures of psychopathy, 
therefore it is the only subscale of the TEIQue-SF used for the current study and contains 
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8 items (α=.56) (e.g. “I find it difficult to see other things from another person’s 
viewpoint.”). 
The TEIQue-SF uses a 7-point Likert scale that ranges from completely disagree 
(1) to completely agree (7) (e.g., “Expressing my emotions with words is not a problem 
for me.”). Scores for the Emotionality subscale range from 8-56, and internal consistency 
was found to be .84 for men and .89 for women (Petrides & Furnham, 2006). The 
TEIQue-SF was created by choosing two items from each of the 15 subscales of the 
TEIQue, based on correlations of the items with the total subscale scores. Internal 
consistency for the total score was .76 (Petrides, Perez-Gonzales, & Furnham, 2007). 
Petrides and colleagues (2007) also found the TEIQue to have good criterion validity. 
The TEIQue has also shown convergent validity by being positively associated with the 
Big-Five personality traits of Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness 
(Mikolajczak, Luminent, Leroy, and Toy, 2007). Mikolajczak et al. (2007) found that the 
Emotionality subscale was negatively related to alexithymia and in terms of discriminate 
validity, the TEIQue was found to be unrelated to cognitive ability. The TEIQue-SF can 
be found in Appendix G.  
Primary and secondary psychopathy. To distinguish between psychopathy 
types, I assessed primary and secondary psychopathy in two ways. First, the Levenson 
Self-Report Psychopathy Scale, which contains both a primary and a secondary subscale, 
was administered (LSRP; Levenson et al., 1995). Individuals with primary psychopathic 
tendencies are thought to be low in anxiety, while those with secondary psychopathic 
tendencies are thought to be highly anxious. Therefore, as a second way to measure the 
distinction between primary and secondary psychopathy, a combination of scores on the 
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Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Revised (PPI-R; Lilienfeld & Widows, 2005) and 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) were 
used, as has been done in previous studies (Glaser & Lutz-Zois, 2014; Vassileva, Kosson, 
Abramowitz, & Conrad, 2005). In previous studies, high PPI-R scorers were defined as 
those scoring above the median and low PPI-R scores were defined as those scoring 
below the median. The same procedure was used to distinguish between high and low 
scores on the STAI. For the current study however, the interaction of the continuous 
variables of the PPI and STAI was used rather than the creation of four discrete groups as 
has been done in the past.  
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy scale (LSRP). The LSRP is a self-report 
measure of psychopathy that includes 26 items (α=.73) and two subscales; one for 
primary psychopathy and one for secondary psychopathy (Levenson et al., 1995). Items 
on the LSRP are reported on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (disagree strongly) to 4 
(agree strongly), thus resulting in a score range of 26 to 104 (Levenson et al., 1995). Of 
the 26 items, 16 (α=.83) are designed to assess traits of primary psychopathy, including 
manipulation, with items such as “In today’s world, I feel justified in doing anything I 
can get away with to succeed.” The remaining 10 items (α=.66) are intended to assess 
features of secondary psychopathy such as impulsivity, and include items such as, “I am 
often bored.” The primary psychopathy subscale scores can result in a range from 16 to 
64 and the secondary psychopathy subscale scores can range from 10 to 40 (Levenson et 
al., 1995). The subscales were used to test the hypotheses of the current study.  
Research by Lynam, Whiteside, and Jones (1999) suggests that the LSRP is a 
reliable and valid measure to assess psychopathy in noninstitutionalized populations. The 
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internal consistency for the primary psychopathy subscale was .84, and the internal 
consistency for the secondary psychopathy subscale was .68 (Lynam et al.). Good 
convergent validity was found in that the LSRP is positively correlated with lifetime drug 
use (r = .25), alcohol use pattern in the past year (r = .31), history of arrest (r = .19), and 
a variety of serious antisocial behavior in the past year (r = .31; Lynamet al.). Convergent 
validity was also found with the individual scales (primary and secondary subscales) and 
the Big-Five personality traits. The primary psychopathy subscale was negatively related 
to Agreeableness and was slightly (not significantly) related to Neuroticism. The 
secondary psychopathy subscale was negatively related to Agreeableness as well, in 
addition to Conscientiousness, and positively related to Neuroticism. According to 
Lynam, et al., this is consistent with the distinction between primary and secondary 
psychopathy. The LSRP has also shown a moderately high correlation with the self-
report version of the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL), Hare’s Self-Report Psychopathy scale 
(r = .64). Levenson et al. (1995) found the primary and secondary scales to be positively 
correlated with one another (r = .40). They found that test-retest reliability of the LSRP 
across an average of eight weeks was high (r = .83). This measure can be found in 
Appendix F. 
Psychopathic Personality Inventory – revised (PPI –R). The PPI-R (Lilienfeld & 
Widows, 2005) is a 154-item (α=.93) measure of psychopathy which includes 8 
subscales, organized into two factors. These factors parallel Hare’s two-factor model of 
psychopathy: Fearless Dominance (PPI –R –I) includes 45 items and Self-Centered 
Impulsivity (PPI-R-II). Each item on the PPI-R is answered on a 4-point Likert scale 
ranging from false (1) to true (4) (e.g., “When people are mad at me, I usually win them 
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over with my charm.”). The Fearless Dominance Scale assesses affective/interpersonal 
traits that are predominately associated with primary psychopathy and consists of the 
following subscales: Social Influence (18 items, α=.88), Fearlessness (14 items, α=.89), 
and Stress Immunity. The Stress Immunity scale was not used in the current study, as it 
may overlap with the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. The Self-Centered Impulsivity scale 
assesses the behavioral-lifestyle traits with generally associated with secondary 
psychopathy and consists of the following subscales: Machiavellian Egocentricity (20 
items), Rebellious Nonconformity (16 items), Blame Externalization (15 items), and 
Carefree Non-planfulness (19 items), with alphas ranging from .85 to .82 (Machiavellian 
Egocentricity-Rebellious Nonconformity). Coldheartnedness is an eighth subscale, but 
does not contribute to either of the two main factors, as it is considered its own factor 
(Uzieblo, Verscheure, Van den Bussche, & Crombez, 2010). The total score on the PPI-R 
ranges from 154 to 616. As the Stress Immunity scale was not included, the possible 
ranges of values for the total psychopathy score were 141-564. 
Lilienfeld and Widows (2005) found acceptable reliability for the PPI-R with 
internal consistency of the PPI-R scales that ranged from .78 to .92. Good test-retest 
reliability was also found for the PPI-R scales (r = -.82 to.95; Lilienfeld & Widows, 
2005). Internal consistency was high for the total score (=.93), the Fearless Dominance 
subscale ( = .87), the Self-Centered Impulsivity subscale ( = .95), and the 
Coldheartedness subscale (=.85). The PPI-R shows good construct validity, as the total 
score has shown a positive association to antisocial behavior (Edens, Poythress, 
Lilienfeld, & Patrick, 2008). Uzieblo and colleagues (2010) found that Fearless 
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Dominance factors (PPI-R-I) is positively related to measures of alcohol use, delinquent 
behavior, cognitive empathy, and social skills. However, the PPI-R-I is negatively 
associated with emotional reactivity. The Self-Centered Impulsivity factors (PPI-R-II) 
were found to be positively associated with anxiety and antisocial behavior. Overall, the 
PPI-R demonstrates good convergent validity, as total scores significantly correlate with 
scores on self-report measures related to psychopathy such as the LSRP (Uzieblo et al., 
2010) and other psychopathy measures like the PCL-R (Copestake, Gray, & Snowden, 
2011). The PPI-R can be found in Appendix G.  
Anxiety.  
The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1970) distinguishes 
between trait anxiety (A-Trait) and state anxiety (A-State). The STAI is a 40-item 
inventory that includes 20 items for trait anxiety (α=.87) and 20 for state anxiety 
(Hedberg, 1972). For the purpose of the current study, as has been done for previous 
studies (Glaser & Lutz-Zois, 2014; Vassileva, Kosson, Abramowitz, & Conrad, 2005), 
only the trait anxiety (A-Trait) scale was used as it instructs the participants to note how 
they generally feel (e.g., “I am a steady person;” Hedberg, 1972). Items for the A-Trait 
trait anxiety include seven reverse scored items and are answered on a four-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (Almost Never) to 4 (Almost Always). Scores on this subscale range 
from 20 to 80, and participants scoring above the median of the sample were categorized 
as high anxious while those scoring below the median were categorized as low anxious.  
According to Hedberg (1972) both the A-State and the A-Trait scales exhibit good 
internal consistency, with the A-Trait scale generating coefficients between .86 and .92 
and the A-State generating internal consistency coefficients between .83 and .92. Test-
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retest coefficients are found to be higher for A-Trait (r = .73 to .86) than for A-State (r = 
.16 to .62; Spielberger, 1983). The A-Trait items have demonstrated good construct 
validity (Gaudry, Vagg, & Speilberger, 1975) and concurrent validity with other 
measures such as the Manifest Anxiety Scale and the Anxiety Scale Questionnaire with 
correlations between .73 and .85 for college students (Spielberger & Sydeman, 1994). 
The STAI can be found in Appendix H.    
Social Desirability. The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; 
Paulhus, 1988) is a 40-item (α=.77) instrument that measures the two factors of socially 
desirable responding: 20 items measure self-deceptive enhancement (SDE) (α=.62) and 
20 items measure impression management (IM) (α=.76). Self-deceptive enhancement is 
described as the tendency to provide self-reports believed by the individual that include a 
positive bias (Paulhus, 1984). Impression management is described by Paulhus (1984) as 
the intentional self-presentation to an audience, such that the individual is consciously 
answering incorrectly with the goal of being perceived positively. Participants respond to 
the 40-items on a 7-point Likert scale according to their level of agreement with items for 
both self-deceptive enhancement (e.g., “I don’t care to know what people really think of 
me.”) and impression management (e.g., “I never swear.”).The Likert scale for the BIDR 
ranges from “1” (not true) to “7” (very true). When scoring this measure, the negatively 
keyed items are first reverse scored, and then one point is given for each extreme 
response (6 or 7) and 0 points are given for all other responses. Each subscale score can 
range from 0 to 20 (all 40-items can be summed for an overall measure of socially 
desirable responses); therefore, those who give exaggeratedly desirable responses attain 
high scores.  
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 The BIDR has shown sufficient internal consistency for the total measure 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .83), for self-deceptive enhancement (.68 to.80), and for impression 
management (.75 to.86). Test-retest correlations are reported at .69 for self-deceptive 
enhancement and .65 for impression management over a 5-week span, respectively 
(Paulhus, 1988). The BDIR demonstrated concurrent validity as a measure of socially 
desirable responding that correlated .71 with the M-C SDS and .80 with the 
Multidimensional Social Desirability Inventory (Paulhus, 1988). The BIDR can be found 
in Appendix I.  
 Demographics. Demographic variables collected for the current study included 
age, gender, ethnicity, and year in school. The demographic form can be found in 
Appendix J. 
Procedure  
Participants were recruited to the current study from an online system linked to 
the University. Participants were able to complete the Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy 
Scale (LSRP) prior to the current study during mass testing in order to help divide 
participants into conditions; however, this was only completed in the initial stages of data 
collection. In the second wave of data collection, the LSRP was administered along with 
all other measures. After agreeing to participate, participants were first instructed on how 
to put on the chest strap heart rate monitor and then left to do so alone. While wearing the 
heart rate monitor, participants completed a mundane, non-emotional task (i.e., a word 
search; see Appendix M) for five minutes to determine baseline heart rate.  
Participants then listened to the mock broadcast, approximately two-minutes and 
30 seconds long, re-recorded based on the broadcast created by Batson et al. (1997) that 
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depicts an empathy-evoking scenario. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions in which approximately half were instructed to imagine how the young woman 
felt, and the other half were instructed to simply to listen to the broadcast (See 
Appendices C and D for instructions). Participants were then instructed to remain seated 
for an additional two minutes. During this time researchers continued to collected heart 
rate information at 30-second intervals to check if the fluctuation (or lack of) in heart rate 
quickly returned to normal or remained steady. Next, participants completed seven 
measures assessing explicit cognitive empathy, implicit cognitive empathy, implicit 
affective empathy, primary and secondary psychopathy, anxiety, and social desirability in 
a counterbalanced order using a random starting order with rotation. Finally participants 
completed a demographic questionnaire asking for information such as age, gender, 
race/ethnicity, grade, etc. They were then thanked for their time and compensated by 
receiving course-required credit.
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CHAPTER III 
 
 RESULTS 
 
Preliminary Analyses  
 The means, standard deviations, ranges and Cronbach’s alpha values of the 
study’s continuous variables are summarized in Table 1. Preliminary analyses were 
conducted to examine the relationship between the criterion variable of empathy and 
social desirability and demographic variables.  
Correlations. I first calculated zero-order correlations between the criterion 
variable of empathy and both social desirability and age. These results are summarized in 
Table 2. 
 Implicit affective and cognitive empathy. There were no significant correlations 
found between measures of implicit affective empathy and those of socially desirable 
responding or age. There were also no significant correlations found between measures of 
implicit cognitive empathy and measures of socially desirable responding or age. 
 Explicit affective empathy. With respect to explicit affective empathy and social 
desirability, there was a significant, positive relationship between explicit affective 
empathy (IRI-EC) and self-deceptive socially desirable responding (BIDR). Those
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 reporting higher levels of empathetic concern were also responding in a more self-
deceptive manner. A significant, negative relationship was found between explicit 
affective empathy (IRI-PD) and self-deceptive socially desirable responding (BIDR). 
Those who reported higher personal distress responded in a less self-deceptive manner. 
No significant correlations were found between the criterion variable of explicit affective 
empathy and age. Therefore, self-deceptive socially desirable responding, but not age, 
will be controlled for in the analysis involving explicit affective empathy.  
Explicit cognitive empathy. Significant, positive correlations were found between 
measures of explicit cognitive empathy (TEIQ-E and IRI-PT) and socially desirable 
responding (BIDR). Explicit cognitive empathy (TEIQ-E) was significantly, positively 
correlated with self-deceptive and impression management socially desirable responding 
(BIDR). Those who reported higher emotionality scores tended to respond to questions in 
a more self-deceptive fashion and tended to more closely manage the impression they 
make on others. Further, explicit cognitive empathy (IRI-PT) was significantly, positively 
correlated with impression management socially desirable responding (BIDR). 
Individuals who reported higher perspective taking abilities had a tendency to respond in 
a way that reflected higher impression management. No significant correlations were 
found between the criterion variable of explicit cognitive empathy and age. Thus, self-
deceptive and impression management socially desirable responding, but not age, will be 
controlled for in the analysis involving explicit cognitive empathy. 
Analysis of Variance. A series of one-way ANOVAs were calculated in order to 
assess for any group difference in ethnicity on empathy. The results revealed that explicit 
affective empathy (IRI-EC/PD) scores significantly varied as a function of ethnicity, 
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F(5,173) = 3.00, p<.05. A post-hoc Tukey test indicated that Asian participants 
(M=23.00, SD=5.72) exhibited lower explicit affective empathy scores when compared 
with Caucasian participants (M=28.61, SD=3.74). A one-way ANOVA also indicated that 
explicit cognitive empathy (IRI-PT and TEIQ-E) scores significantly varied as a function 
of ethnicity, F(5,179) = 3.05, p<.05. Post-hoc Tukey tests indicated that those Asian 
participants (M=34.25, SD=7.68) exhibited lower explicit cognitive empathy when 
compared with Caucasian participants (M=40.28, SD=6.28). Implicit cognitive empathy 
(RMET) also varied as a function of ethnicity, F(5,177) = 3.47, p=.005. Post-hoc Tukey 
tests suggested that Asian participants (M=18.51, SD=8.64) displayed lower implicit 
cognitive empathy when compared with Caucasian participants (M=25.86, SD=4.92). No 
group differences were found in ethnicity for implicit affective empathy. In summary, 
ethnicity will be controlled for in the analysis involving explicit affective, explicit 
cognitive, and implicit cognitive empathy.  
 Independent-samples t-test. A series of independent-samples t-test were 
calculated in order to assess for any group difference in gender on empathy. The results 
revealed significant group differences between all measures of explicit affective empathy 
on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (fantasy subscale, t(174)=-2.56, p<.05; empathetic 
concern subscale, t(173)=-3.31, p=.001; and personal distress subscale, t(174)=-3.25, 
p=.001). Males demonstrated explicit affective empathy scores lower (M=24.19, 
SD=6.03) than females (M=26.42, SD=5.02) on the fantasy subscale; males scored lower 
(M=26.86, SD=4.26) than females (M=28.93, SD=3.61) on the empathetic concern 
subscale; and males scored lower (M=18.03, SD=4.51) than females (M=20.52, SD=4.82) 
on the personal distress subscale. Overall, these results suggest that males reported 
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experiencing less explicit affective empathy (IRI-EC/PD) than females. Trends were 
found for explicit cognitive empathy measures (IRI-PT and TEIQ-E) and gender t(179)=-
1.94, p=.054, such that males demonstrated a trend toward lower (M=38.34, SD=6.90) 
scores than females (M=40.27, SD=6.02). An additional trend was found for implicit 
affective empathy and gender t(178)=-1.65, p=.17, such that males demonstrated a trend 
toward lower (M=-.17, SD=1.35) scores than females (M=.09, SD=.76). Therefore, 
gender will be statistically controlled only in the analyses involving explicit affective 
(IRI-EC/PD) and explicit cognitive (IRI-PT and TEIQ-E) empathy. 
Primary Analyses 
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis (i.e., that primary psychopathy will be 
positively related to explicit measures of cognitive empathy and unrelated to implicit 
measures of cognitive empathy) was analyzed in two different ways, depending on the 
assessment of psychopathy. To begin, hierarchical multiple regression equations were 
computed using either explicit or implicit cognitive empathy as the criterion variable and 
psychopathy type (as determined by the continuous interaction of the STAI and PPI) as 
the predictor variable (such that high levels of psychopathy and low levels of anxiety 
indicates primary psychopathy, while high levels of psychopathy and high anxiety 
indicates secondary psychopathy). Demographic and social desirability variables that 
were significantly correlated with implicit and explicit cognitive empathy were entered 
into the first step of the regression equations. The second step included the centered STAI 
and PPI and the interaction effect of the STAI and PPI (PsyAnx).  
When using explicit cognitive empathy as the criterion variable, the results 
suggested that there were significant main effect for anxiety, as well as for psychopathic 
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tendencies (See Table 3). These main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of 
anxiety by psychopathic tendencies. As the interaction was significant, it was then 
decomposed using the method outlined in Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken (2003) to 
determine the association between explicit cognitive empathy and psychopathy at low 
levels of anxiety. The results suggested a significant main effect for psychopathy at low 
levels of anxiety (β =-.184, p<.001). Thus, in contrary to the hypotheses, those with 
tendencies of psychopathy at low levels of anxiety reported experiencing significantly 
less explicit cognitive empathy than those low in psychopathy. As high levels of anxiety 
are theorized to be associated with secondary psychopathy, the decomposed results for 
high levels of anxiety are described in Hypothesis 2.  
I also predicted that there would be no difference between those with primary 
psychopathy and psychopathy free groups in implicit measures of cognitive empathy. The 
results suggested a non-significant main effect for anxiety (STAI), and a marginally 
significant main effect for psychopathic tendencies (PPI) (See Table 4). These main 
effects were qualified by the interaction of anxiety by psychopathic tendencies. As the 
interaction was significant, it was then decomposed to determine the association between 
implicit cognitive empathy and psychopathy at low levels of anxiety. When decomposed, 
results suggested a non-significant main effect for psychopathy at low levels of anxiety (β 
=.004, p>.05). Thus, as predicted, there is no difference between those with psychopathic 
tendencies at low levels of anxiety and those with low levels of psychopathy for implicit 
measures of cognitive empathy. Again, because high levels of anxiety are suggested to be 
associated with secondary psychopathy, the decomposed results for high levels of anxiety 
are described in Hypothesis 2.  
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When using the LSRP to assess primary psychopathy, a series of stepwise 
multiple regressions were computed using either explicit or implicit cognitive empathy as 
the criterion variable. Demographic and social desirability variables that were 
significantly correlated with implicit and explicit cognitive empathy were entered into the 
first step of the regression equations. Both the primary and secondary psychopathy 
subscales of the LSRP were entered in the second step of the regression equation. I 
hypothesized that a significant, positive relationship would be found between primary 
psychopathy and explicit cognitive empathy. The results indicated that the association 
between primary psychopathy and explicit cognitive empathy was not significant, such 
that explicit cognitive empathy scores did not increase for each unit increase for primary 
psychopathy scores (See Table 5). I also hypothesized that no association would be found 
between primary psychopathy and implicit cognitive empathy. The stepwise regression 
supports the hypothesis, as there was no significant association found between primary 
psychopathy and implicit cognitive empathy (=-.159, p>.05), such that increases in 
primary psychopathy scores did not predict a change in empathy scores (See Table 6).  
Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis (i.e., that secondary psychopathy will be 
negatively related to both explicit and implicit measures of cognitive empathy) was also 
analyzed in two different ways, depending on how psychopathy was assessed. The same 
hierarchical regressions described in Hypothesis 1 (using either implicit or explicit 
cognitive empathy as the criterion variable and psychopathy type determined by 
STAIxPPI as the predictor variable) were also used to test Hypothesis 2.  
When using explicit cognitive empathy as the criterion variable, as stated 
previously, the results suggested that there was a significant main effect for psychopathy 
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that was qualified by a significant interaction of anxiety by psychopathic tendencies (See 
Table 3). As the interaction was significant, it was then decomposed to determine the 
association between explicit cognitive empathy and psychopathy at high levels of 
anxiety. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, these results suggested a non-significant main 
effect for psychopathy (β =.045, p>.05), such that individuals with psychopathic 
tendencies, at high levels of anxiety, were not less likely to report experiencing explicit 
cognitive empathy than those low in psychopathy. 
When measuring implicit cognitive empathy as the criterion variable, as stated 
previously the results suggested a non-significant main effect for anxiety (STAI), and a 
marginally significant main effect for psychopathic tendencies (PPI) (See Table 4). These 
main effects were qualified by a significant interaction of anxiety by psychopathic 
tendencies. As the interaction was significant, it was decomposed. The results suggested a 
significant main effect for psychopathy at high levels of anxiety (β=-.299, p<.01). 
Therefore, consistent with Hypothesis 2, individuals with tendencies of psychopathy at 
high levels of anxiety reported experiencing significantly less implicit cognitive empathy 
than those low in psychopathy.  
Using the LSRP to assess secondary psychopathy, the same regression equations 
used to test Hypothesis 1 were used. I hypothesized that a significant negative association 
would be found between secondary psychopathy and implicit and explicit cognitive 
empathy (See Tables 5 and 6). The results suggested that there were no significant 
associations between secondary psychopathy and explicit cognitive empathy or implicit 
cognitive empathy. Therefore, the hypothesis was not supported using the LSRP to assess 
secondary psychopathy.  
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Hypothesis 3. The last hypothesis (i.e., that both primary and secondary 
psychopathy will be negatively related to implicit measures of affective empathy) was 
also analyzed in two different ways, depending on how psychopathy was assessed. 
Regressions were run using implicit, affective empathy as the criterion variable and 
psychopathy type (as determined by the combination of the STAI and PPI) as the 
predictor variable. As there were no demographic or social desirability variables 
correlated to implicit affective empathy, none were controlled for in the regression. I 
hypothesized that both primary and secondary groups would exhibit more implicit 
affective deficits than those low in psychopathic attributes.  
The results indicated a non-significant main effect for anxiety (STAI), but a 
significant main effect for psychopathic tendencies (PPI). The main effects were qualified 
by the significant interaction effect (See Table 7). As the interaction was significant, it 
was decomposed by looking at the effect of psychopathy at both high and low levels of 
anxiety. When determining the association between primary or secondary psychopathy 
and implicit affective empathy at low levels of anxiety, there was a non-significant main 
effect for psychopathy (β =-.104, p>.05).  
In decomposing the interaction for psychopathy at high levels of anxiety, there 
was a significant main effect for psychopathy (β =-.252, p<.05). Therefore, results 
suggested that those with psychopathy, at high levels of anxiety, appear to experience 
significantly less implicit affective empathy than other groups. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is 
supported for secondary psychopathy when using the PPI x STAI interaction as an index 
of psychopathy.  
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Using the LSRP to assess primary and secondary psychopathy, a multiple 
regression analysis was computed using implicit affective empathy as the criterion 
variable (Table 8). There were no demographic or social desirability variables that were 
significantly correlated with implicit affective empathy. Therefore, only the primary and 
secondary psychopathy subscales of the LSRP were entered in the regression equation. 
The results suggested that there were no significant associations between primary or 
secondary psychopathy and implicit affective empathy, such that for each unit increase in 
psychopathy scores, there was not a significant change in implicit affective 
measurements. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not supported when using the LSRP to 
assess primary and secondary psychopathy.  
Research question. To answer the research question (Do the response patterns of 
individuals with primary and secondary psychopathic traits vary depending on the 
context created by listening styles?) a series of hierarchical stepwise regressions were 
run. For these analyses, the specific empathy type under examination served as the 
criterion variable. Variables to control for were entered in the first step of the regression 
equation, while the experimental listening style (empathy evoking instructions) and 
psychopathy were entered as main effects in the second step. The third step included the 
interaction effect for listening style by psychopathy type (LSRP) as the predictor 
variable. Primary and secondary psychopathy (LSRPP/LSRPS) were run in separate 
regression equations. For the research question, psychopathy was only measured using 
the primary and secondary subscales of the LSRP.  
When using the LSRPP (primary) with the criterion variable of implicit cognitive 
empathy, there were no significant main effects for listening condition or for primary 
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psychopathy (LSRPP). The overall model also suggests a non-significant interaction (See 
Table 9). Therefore, it was not decomposed.  
When using the LSRPS (secondary) with the criterion variable of implicit 
cognitive empathy, a significant main effect was found for secondary psychopathy 
(LSRPS), but not for listening condition. The significant main effect was qualified by a 
significant interaction of listening condition by secondary psychopathy (See Table 10). 
As the interaction was significant, it was then decomposed using the method described by 
Jaccard & Turrisi (2003). In the experimental listening condition, a non-significant main 
effect for psychopathy (β =-.027, p>.05) was found. Therefore, when individuals with 
secondary psychopathic traits were in the experimental listening condition, they were not 
more likely that those low in secondary psychopathy to score low in measures of implicit 
cognitive empathy. 
When using the LSRPP (primary) with the criterion variable explicit cognitive 
empathy (See Table 11), there was a significant main effect for listening condition such 
that those in the experimental condition received lower scores on measures of explicit 
cognitive empathy. However, there was no significant main effect for secondary 
psychopathy. The overall model also suggested a non-significant interaction. As there 
was not a significant interaction, follow up analyses were not necessary. 
When using the LSRPS (secondary) with the criterion variable explicit cognitive 
empathy (See Table 12), there were significant main effects for listening condition and 
for secondary psychopathy. These main effects were qualified by a significant 
interaction. As the interaction was significant, it was then decomposed. In analyzing the 
experimental listening condition, the main effect for psychopathy was non-significant (β 
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=.034, p=>.05). Thus, when individuals with secondary psychopathic traits are placed 
into either the control or experimental listening condition, they were not more likely than 
those low in secondary psychopathy to score low in measures of explicit cognitive 
empathy.  
When using the LSRPP (primary) with the criterion variable implicit affective 
empathy there were no significant main effects for listening condition, or for psychopathy 
(See Table 13). The overall model was also non-significant. No follow up analyses were 
necessary as the interaction was not significant. When using the LSRPS (secondary) with 
the criterion variable of implicit affective empathy, there was a significant main effect for 
listening condition, but not for psychopathy (See Table 14). The main effect was not 
qualified by a significant interaction, therefore, follow up analyses were not performed. 
When using the LSRPP (primary) with the criterion variable explicit affective 
empathy there was a significant main effect for primary psychopathy, but not for listening 
condition. The significant main effect was qualified by a significant interaction of 
listening style by primary psychopathy (See Table 15). As the interaction was significant, 
it was then decomposed. When analyzing the experimental listening condition, the main 
effect for psychopathy was non-significant (β =-.114, p>.05). Therefore, when 
individuals with primary psychopathic tendencies are placed into either the control or 
experimental listening condition, they were not more likely than those low in primary 
psychopathy to score low on measures of explicit affective empathy. 
When using the LSRPS (secondary) with the criterion variable explicit affective 
empathy (See Table 16), there were no significant main effects for listening conditions, 
or for secondary psychopathy. However, the overall model was a significant for the 
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interaction of secondary psychopathy and listening condition. As the interaction was 
significant, it was then decomposed. The main effect of psychopathy in the experimental 
listening condition was significant (β =.246, p<.01). Therefore, when individuals with 
secondary psychopathic tendencies are placed in the experimental listening condition, 
their scores on measures of explicit affective empathy significantly increased.  
Overall, the answer to the proposed research question (Do the response patterns of 
individuals with primary and secondary psychopathic traits vary depending on the 
context created by listening styles?) is that those with secondary psychopathic traits are 
more likely to have significant interactions found for the experimental listening condition 
by psychopathy type for all forms of empathy tested, with the exception of implicit 
affective empathy. However, a significant main effect was found only for explicit 
affective empathy such that only the explicit affective responses of individuals with 
secondary tendencies were changed when they were placed in the experimental, 
additional empathy evoking, condition. For all other conditions, the current study was 
unable to differentiate, when decomposed, the degree to which psychopathy and empathy 
varied as an effect of the listening condition.  
No significant interactions were found for those with primary tendencies, except 
for explicit affective empathy in which no significant main effect was determined. This is 
in alignment with our expectations that those with primary tendencies would be less 
affected than those with secondary tendencies in the listening condition intended to evoke 
further empathy.
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
A lack of empathy has traditionally been considered to be the primary feature of 
psychopathy (Cleckley, 1964; Hare, 2003; Lykken, 1995). While some studies have 
found results suggesting an empathetic deficit (Bagley, Abramowitz, and Kosson, 2009; 
Vidal, Skeem and Camp, 2010), others have yet to do so (Glaser & Lutz-Zois, 2014, 
Lishner et al., 2012; Mulllins-Nelson, Salekin, & Leistico, 2006). Using a large 
undergraduate sample, the present study aimed to do what previous studies had not, by 
parsing out the different empathy types (implicit and explicit cognitive and affective 
empathy), while adding the implicit affective measure of heart rate, as well as parsing out 
the two most commonly defined psychopathy types; primary and secondary (Karpman, 
1941; Skeem, et al., 2003).  
The present study yielded mixed results for the hypotheses. As hypothesized, 
there was no association between primary psychopathic tendencies and implicit cognitive 
empathy, but individuals with secondary psychopathic tendencies appeared to experience 
less implicit cognitive and affective empathy. However, these results were only found 
when psychopathy was assessed as an interaction between the PPI and STAI. Moreover, 
associations were not found between primary psychopathy and explicit cognitive 
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empathy or implicit affective empathy, nor were associations found between secondary 
psychopathy and explicit cognitive empathy. I will now discuss each of the hypothesized 
results and the research question, followed by the limitations of the current study, 
directions for future research, and implications of the current findings. Because each of 
the main hypotheses was tested using two different measurements of psychopathy 
(through the PPIxSTAI and the LSRP), the results for each are discussed separately, as 
needed.  
Hypothesis 1: Primary Psychopathy and Explicit or Implicit Cognitive Empathy  
The current study hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship 
between primary psychopathy and explicit cognitive empathy, such that those with 
primary tendencies would be more able to use their emotional intelligence to recognize 
emotions within themselves and others, as well as identifying empathetic concern for 
others. Contrary to this hypothesis, the results suggested that individuals with 
psychopathic tendencies at low levels of anxiety (indicating primary psychopathic 
tendencies; as determined by a combination of the PPIxSTAI) were less able to 
consciously process and recognize such emotional factors (explicit cognitive). When 
using the LSRP as the psychopathy measure, individuals were no more or less likely to 
express such emotional intelligence when compared to those with low psychopathy. 
Overall, the current study expected the learned emotional intelligence of individuals with 
primary tendencies to be exaggerated with higher scores on measures of explicit 
cognitive empathy, as they have been in the past, possibly due to years of practice 
compensating for their inherited deficit (Lishner, et al., 2007).  
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In alignment with the second part of Hypothesis 1, primary psychopathy was 
unrelated to implicit cognitive empathy. That is, individuals with primary tendencies 
were no more or less able to implicitly recognize and label emotional states based on 
images of human eyes, regardless of how psychopathy was assessed. This result is similar 
to the findings by Vidal et al. (2010), suggesting that those with primary psychopathy 
were actually able to intellectually recognize and understand emotions.  
Hypothesis 2: Secondary Psychopathy and Explicit or Implicit Cognitive Empathy 
 Individuals with secondary psychopathic tendencies (as determined by either the 
PPIxSTAI or the LSRP) were not more or less able to identify emotional states of 
themselves or others or take the perspective of others (using emotional intelligence in 
explicit cognitive assessments) when compared with those who had low psychopathic 
tendencies. This contradicted the first part Hypothesis 2, stating that individuals with 
secondary tendencies would experience less explicit cognitive empathy. This comes as a 
surprise, as Vidal et al. (2010) had suggested that those with secondary tendencies would 
exhibit lower levels of emotional intelligence than others.  
 In agreement with the second part of Hypothesis 2, individuals with secondary 
psychopathic tendencies (as determined by PPIxSTAI) were significantly less able to 
implicitly label the mental states of others based on images of eyes, than those with low 
levels of psychopathy (implicit cognitive). However, contradicting this hypothesis, when 
the LSRP was used to determine secondary psychopathy, there was no significant 
correlation between secondary psychopathy and implicit cognitive empathy. 
The majority of these result were not expected, as previous research had 
suggested that those with secondary tendencies have significantly lower cognitive 
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empathetic abilities overall. It was thought that impulsivity and negative affect would 
impair their ability to learn the feelings of others and their ability to regulate any emotion 
(Vidal et al., 2010). However, as the current study’s results suggest, individuals with 
secondary psychopathic tendencies display explicit cognitive empathetic abilities, and 
implicit cognitive empathetic abilities (depending on the psychopathy assessment) similar 
to those without psychopathic traits.  
Hypothesis 3: Primary and Secondary Psychopathy and Implicit Affective Empathy 
 Contradicting the first part of the third hypothesis, those with primary 
psychopathic tendencies (as determined by PPIxSTAI and LSRP) did not experience 
significantly different physiological reactivity (implicit affective empathy) than to those 
low in psychopathy when exposed to an emotionally evocative broadcast. These results 
also contradict the work of Vidal et al. (2010), Bagley et al. (2009), and Blair, Jones, 
Clark, and Smith (1997), who suggested that there are empathetic deficits, both affective 
and implicit affective, for those with psychopathy.  
However, in alignment with the second part of Hypothesis 3, individuals with 
secondary psychopathy (as determined by the PPIxSTAI) did experience less 
spontaneous emotional reactivity (i.e., implicit affective empathy) to an emotional 
broadcast than those low in psychopathy, but again, only when psychopathy was assessed 
using the PPIxSTAI. When using the LSRP, the second part of Hypothesis 3 was not 
supported.  
Research question: Response Pattern Variation in Different Listening Conditions 
 Although Batson, Early, and Salvarani (1997) found that different listening 
contexts could affect an individual’s response to a situation, the current study did not 
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fully support their findings. Although the current study was largely correct in the 
supposition that those with primary psychopathic tendencies would not be affected in the 
experimental, empathy evoking condition due to their ability to “keep cool” in stressful 
situations (Vidal et al., 2010), issues arose in findings for those with secondary 
tendencies. As noted, Batson et al. (1997) found that instructing individuals to imagine as 
if they were the victim and think about what the victim is going through enhanced 
personal distress and empathetic responses for non-clinical and clinical populations. For 
the current study, this result was only confirmed for individuals with secondary 
tendencies when reporting explicit affective empathy. It was highly anticipated that a 
change in implicit affective measures would involve the most significant change in 
response patterns for those with secondary tendencies, however, this was the only 
empathy type in which no significant results were found whatsoever in interactions or 
main effects. This will be further discussed in limitations and directions.  
Summary of Results as an Aggregate 
In looking at the overall results of the current study, many of the gaps in our 
understanding the relation of psychopathy to empathy remain. Bagley et al. (2009) 
suggested that those with psychopathy had lower cognitive empathetic abilities overall. 
While there may be some agreement in the literature this, it does not help to narrow down 
what cognitive empathetic deficits are experienced by whom. Vidal et al. (2010) found 
that those with secondary psychopathic tendencies had significantly lower emotional 
intelligence than those with primary tendencies. The current study suggests partial 
agreement, as those with secondary tendencies (as determine by STAIxPPI) were 
significantly less able to display implicit cognitive and affective abilities. However, those 
 
 
 
  
51 
 
with primary tendencies reported lower explicit cognitive abilities while those with 
secondary tendencies were not significantly different than those without psychopathic 
tendencies in explicit cognitive empathy. 
 In addition, more significant results stemmed from examining secondary 
tendencies with the PPIxSTAI versus the LSRP. This aligns with prior research 
suggesting that those with secondary tendencies are less successful at integrating into 
society than those with primary tendencies, as they are predisposed to anxious and 
impulsive temperaments, potentially making it easier to measure their empathetic deficits 
(Vidal et al., 2010). Those with primary tendencies on the other hand, are thought to be 
successful at keeping calm in pressure situations, which could also help to explain the 
current results. Unfortunately, the results still leave unsolved inconsistencies in the lack 
of significant results, even when empathy and psychopathy types are distinguished, and 
discrepancies in results when using the PPIxSTAI versus the LSRP.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The current study was limited to participation from undergraduate students, 
largely from introductory psychology classes. Mullins-Nelson et al. (2006) suggest that 
the continuous dimensions of psychopathy allow for psychopathic tendencies to be found 
in the community and college-age samples. It is also suggested that the LSRP is a reliable 
and valid measure to assess psychopathy in noninstitutionalized populations (Lynam, 
Whiteside, and Jones, 1999). However, it is always possible that using this non-clinical 
population could have had an effect on the results. Future research may benefit in using 
either a clinical or forensic sample to examine the types of empathetic deficits 
experienced by those with true psychopathic tendencies, as well as stronger effects for 
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listening context. From this, the research on “successful” (e.g., not incarcerated) and 
“non-successful” (e.g., incarcerated) psychopaths could be built upon (Ishikawa, Raine, 
Lencz, Bihrle, & Lacasse, 2011). 
Further, the current study used a basic Zephyr Bluetooth wireless heart rate sensor 
to measure heart rate changes in examining implicit affective empathy. While this 
equipment was sufficient, studies that have found results suggesting that physiological 
reactivity is associated to psychopathy have used other, possibly more advanced, 
equipment such as skin conductance response measures (Blair et al., 1997). It is possible 
that we would see the implicit affective empathetic deficit in those with primary 
tendencies if more advanced equipment was used. The use of such equipment, along with 
multiple types of physiological measurements, would benefit future research by 
increasing the accuracy of the readings and lessening the chance of losing participants 
due to equipment malfunctions.  
In addition, previous research has evoked empathy in ways different from the 
current study. For example, Blair, Jones, Clark, and Smith (1997) successfully used 
images such as crying faces, along with skin conductance response, while Lishner et al. 
(2007) used upsetting news articles that the participants had to read. Perhaps future 
research would benefit from using multiple media methods to evoke empathy and 
determine which is most effective (along with multiple physiological measures). It could 
be the case that while the news broadcast from the current study did evoke empathy, it 
did not evoke the level of empathy needed to address a variation in reactions between 
individuals with and without psychopathic tendencies. For example, if choosing to use 
the broadcast from the current study, perhaps future researchers could provide 
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participants with images of the family pre and post tragedy or (minimally graphic) 
images from the scene of the accident to enhance the differences between those without 
and with psychopathy. Additionally, if future research were to look at listening context 
effects it would be beneficial to add emphasis to the listening instructions in some way. 
While the current study simply had participants read the instructions, future studies could 
also have it stated verbally prior to the broadcast and provide examples. Further, when 
examining the effects of listening contexts, it would be beneficial to include a third 
listening condition as Batson et al. (1997) had. In the current study there was a control 
condition in which the participants were instructed to listen to the broadcast, and an 
experimental condition in which the listening instructions intended to evoke empathy. 
Batson and colleagues’ had a third condition in which the participants were to remain 
objective. This objective condition could be critical, as it is telling individuals who may 
be naturally empathetic, to be less empathetic, therefore potentially increasing the chance 
of a listening context effect.  
Finally, individuals with tendencies of secondary psychopathy may be prone to 
experience emotions such as anxiety. Therefore, it is reasonable to suggest that the 
current emotional state of individuals with secondary tendencies may affect their 
responses. For instance, if an individual is angry, they may be less likely to respond in an 
empathetic way; if they are happy, responses may resemble a ‘normal’ empathetic 
response. Therefore, it would be beneficial for future research to manipulate mood states 
by enhancing negative states such as distress. In doing this, the typical characteristics of 
secondary psychopathy may be highlighted.   
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Implications and Conclusions 
 A notable strength of this study included the use of several empathy measures 
(including a physiological measure for implicit affective empathy) as well as measuring 
psychopathy in two different ways. As the findings of the current study suggest, 
measuring psychopathy with both the LSRP and the PPIxSTAI interaction resulted in 
some significant differences in results for primary psychopathy and explicit cognitive 
empathy and for secondary psychopathy and implicit cognitive and affective empathy 
results. As the current study stemmed from, and shares methods with the work of Glaser 
and Zois (2014), it is important to explore potential explanations for the differences in 
results. For example, the current study analyzed psychopathy using the PPIxSTAI as a 
continuous variable, instead of categorical as Glaser and Zois (2014) had done. As 
significant results were more often found in the current study when psychopathy was 
analyzed this way (versus the LSRP), there might be added benefit in examining 
psychopathy on a continuum instead of categorically.  
 While the original conceptualization of psychopathy includes a callous lack of 
empathy for others (Cleckley, 1964), there are many questions left unanswered as to the 
specific empathetic deficits experienced by individuals with these tendencies. The current 
study found only some hypotheses to be supported by using a mixture of self-report and 
affective, physiological methods. Based on the current study, an implication for future 
research is to continue to utilize physiological measures as well as examining the need for 
the distinction between primary and secondary psychopathy to be examined continuously 
instead of categorically.  
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From a clinical perspective, the outlook of treatment (through therapy or other 
means) is dependent on the understanding of what deficits those with psychopathic 
tendencies experience. Harris and Rice (2006) detail a poor outlook on the treatments 
available for individuals with psychopathy, describing situations in which treatments that 
are effective for some, may actually promote recidivism for those with psychopathy. 
Treatments for Cluster B’s Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) don’t fare much 
better, as they are described as difficult to implement in individual and group sessions, 
and studied less often (Kraus & Reynolds, 2001). Kraus and Reynolds suggest that 
prevention could be a key factor for ASPD; however, this could be difficult to implement 
depending on the psychopathy type.  
If research were to enhance treatment with the distinction of psychopathy types 
and their respective and distinguished etiologies in mind, then treatments would also need 
to look different for each type. Based strictly off of the current study’s findings, there 
would not be an instance where individuals’ with primary or secondary tendencies are 
experiencing the same general empathetic deficits. This is where the implementation of 
treatment needs to begin, examining specific deficits and looking into, or creating, 
interventions and preventative measures that focus in on said empathetic deficits in a 
productive manner.  
In summation, while results of the current study did not clearly delineate the 
empathetic deficits of those with psychopathic tendencies as it set out to do, it did provide 
the field with some significant results that both aligned and contradicted research from 
the past. The current study built upon the mistakes of past research to improve the field 
and suggested areas to look to next. In addition, it underscored the importance that lies 
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within the distinction between psychopathy and empathy types, specifically including a 
physiological, difficult to feign, measure of implicit affective empathy, to strengthen 
psychopathy research methodology, results, and treatment implementations.   
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Variables          M SD Min-Max α 
 
Total LSRP 46.29   8.75 28-75 .73 
   Primary 26.99   6.41 17-45 .83 
   Secondary 19.38   4.05 10-32 .66 
Total PPI       289.98 41.27      0-371 .95 
   PPI (ME) 41.41   8.52  22-62 .85 
   PPI (RN) 33.83    7.66 17-54 .82 
   PPI (BE) 29.77   7.19 16-48 .85 
   PPI (CN) 34.61   7.27 19-54 .82 
   PPI (SOI) 47.40   9.08 20-68 .88 
   PPI (F) 33.91   9.85 14-56 .89 
Total STAI-A 41.00   8.98   0-64 .87 
Total BIDR 11.56   5.46   0-31 .77 
   BIDR (SD)   5.72   3.02   0-14 .62 
   BIDR (IM)   5.82   3.55   0-19 .76 
Explicit 
Affective 
      
   IRI (PT) 25.51   4.33 14-35 .75 
   IRI (PD) 19.74   4.85         9-34 .76 
   IRI (FS) 25.73   5.44 12-35 .82 
Explicit 
Cognitive 
    
   TEIQ-SF (E) 39.63   6.37     21.33-55 .56 
   IRI (EC) 28.29   3.93 15-35 .73 
Implicit 
Cognitive 
    
   RMET 25.41   5.27   8.23-46.29 .45 
Implicit 
Affective 
     
   HR     .00     .99  -3.29-8.07  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Study Variables 
 
Note. LSRP=Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale; PPI=Psychopathic Personality 
Inventory-revised; PPI(ME)=Machiavellian Egocentricity subscale; PPI(RN)=Rebellious 
Nonconformity subscale; PPI(BE)=Blame Externalization subscale; PPI(CN)=Carefree 
Nonplanfullness subscale; PPI(SOI)=Social Influence subscale; PPI(F)=Fearlessness subscale; 
STAI=State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; BIDR=The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding; 
BIDR SD =Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale; BIDR IM =Impression Management 
subscale; IRI=Interpersonal Reactivity Index; IRI(PT)=Perspective Taking subscale; 
IRI(PD)=Personal Distress subscale; IRI(FS)=Fantasy Subscale; TEIQue-SF(E)=Trait 
Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire – Short Form Emotionality subscale; IRI(EC)=Empathetic 
Concern subscale; RMET=Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test; HR=Heart Rate. 
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 Age BIDR-
SDE 
BIDR-
IM 
BIDR-
Total 
IRI 
(EC) 
IRI 
(PD) 
IRI 
(FS) 
TEIQ 
(E) 
IRI 
(PT) 
RME
T 
HR 
            
Age 1.000           
BIDR-
(SD) 
  .022 1.000          
BIDR 
(IM) 
  .056   .376** 1.000         
BIDR-
(T) 
  .049   .801** .857** 1.000        
Explicit  
Affective 
IRI 
(EC) 
  .029   .156* .312**  .287** 1.000       
IRI 
(PD) 
  .105  -.341** -.098 -.252** .145 1.000      
IRI (F)   .028   .016   .090   .067 .219** .168* 1.000     
Explicit  
Cognitive 
TEIQ 
(E) 
  .029    .220** .307**   .320** .483** -.199** .176* 1.000    
IRI 
(PT) 
  .000    .029 .327**   .228* .488** -.047 .182* .428** 1.000   
Implicit  
Cognitive 
RMET -.130    .061 .106   .103 .185* -.034 .202** .176* .061 1.000  
Implicit  
Affective 
HR -.007   -.063 .063   .006 .076 .080 .121 .078 .005 .115 1.000 
Table 2 
Zero-Order Correlations between the Continuous demographic Variables (Age), Social  
Desirability (Self-Deceptive Enhancement and Impression Management), and the Criterion Variable 
(Empathy) 
 
Note. STAI= State-Trait Anxiety Inventory; BIDR= The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding; 
BIDR SD = Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale; BIDR IM  = Impression Management subscale; 
BIDR T = Total; IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index; IRI(PT) = Perspective Taking subscale; IRI(PD) 
= ; IRI(FS)= Fantasy Subscale; TEIQ (E) Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire-Short Form 
Emotionality subscale = Trait Emotional Intelligence Questionnaire – Short Form Emotionality 
subscale; IRI(EC) = Empathetic Concern subscale; RMET = Reading  
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
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  Table 3 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Psychopathy 
(PPIxSTAI) Variables predicting Explicit Cognitive Empathy   
 Note: BIDR SD = Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale; BIDR IM = Impression   
Management subscale; STAI=State Trait Anxiety Inventory; PPI=Psychopathic 
Personality Inventory; PsyAnx=Interaction term for STAI x PPI. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
 
 
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:           .213*  
     Asian    -.033 .032         -.070   
     Gender     .038 .010         .261***   
     BIRD SD            .003 .002          .112   
     BIRD IM     .007 .001         .330***   
Step 2:         .394*** .181 
     STAI    -.002 .001       -.287***   
     PPI     .000 .000   -.184*   
     PsyAnx  -4.314E-5 .000       -.573***   
 69  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Primary and Secondary Psychopathy 
(STAIxPPI) Variables predicting Implicit Cognitive Empathy  
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:    .037***  
     Asian -7.023  2.787     -.193**   
Step 2:    .169*** .132 
     STAI    .054   .047    .088   
     PPI   -.020   .011   -.147   
     PsyAnx   -.002   .001         -
.377*** 
  
Note: STAI=State Trait Anxiety Inventory; PPI=Psychopathic Personality Inventory; 
PsyAnx=Interaction term for STAI x PPI. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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Table 5 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Psychopathy (LSRP) 
Variables predicting Explicit Cognitive Empathy   
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:          
.213*** 
 
     BIRD SD .003 .002  .128   
     BIRD IM .006 .002        .329***   
     Asian  -.036 .032         -.083   
     Gender .032 .010       .234**   
Step 2:     .216 .003 
     LSRPP .000 .001  -.047   
     LSRPS .001 .001    .055   
Note: BIDR SD = Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale; BIDR IM = Impression 
Management subscale; LSRPP=Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Primary 
subscale; LSRPS= Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Secondary subscale. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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Table 6 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Primary and Secondary Psychopathy 
(LSRP) Variables predicting Implicit Cognitive Empathy  
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:         .040**  
     Asian  -6.245  2.795     -.174*   
Step 2:     .060 .020 
     LSRPP   -.134    .074    -.159   
     LSRPS     .053    .112     .042   
Note: LSRPP=Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Primary subscale; LSRPS= 
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Secondary subscale.  
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 
Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Psychopathy (PPIxSTAI)  
Variables predicting Implicit Affective Empathy  
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
    .035  
STAI   .001 .007 .014   
PPI -.003 .002 -.178*   
PsyAnx   .000 .000 -.184*   
Note: STAI=State Trait Anxiety Inventory; PPI=Psychopathic Personality  
Inventory; PsyAnx=Interaction term for STAI x PPI. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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Table 8 
Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Psychopathy (LSRP) Variables 
predicting Implicit Affective Empathy  
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
    .005  
     LSRPP .004 .013 .023   
     LSRPS .012 .020 .053   
Note: LSRPP=Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale Primary subscale; LSRPS= 
Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Secondary subscale. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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Table 9 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Primary Psychopathy 
Variables predicting Implicit Cognitive Empathy for Listening Contexts 
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:       .039**  
     Asian -7.127 2.676 -.198*   
Step 2:    .066 .027 
     Experimental  -1.099  .802 -.102   
     LSRPP    -.103  .061 -.127   
Step 3:    .072 .005 
     
Experimental_Primary 
   
  .126 
 
 .126 
 
 .259 
  
Note: LSRPP=Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Primary subscale; 
Experimental_Primary = Interaction term for listening condition x primary psychopathy. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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Table 10 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Secondary 
Psychopathy Variables predicting Implicit Cognitive Empathy for for Listening Contexts 
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:       .040**  
     Asian -7.519  2.820    -.211**   
Step 2:    .051 .011 
     Experimental  -1.086   .839 -.100   
     LSRPS Centered  -.034   .099  -.027   
Step 3:    .077* .026 
     
Experimental_Seconday 
 
  .440 
 
  .203 
 
    .577* 
  
Note: LSRPS =  Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Secondary subscale; 
Experimental_Secondary = listening condition x secondary psychopathy.  
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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Table 11 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Primary Psychopathy 
Variables predicting Explicit Cognitive Empathy for Listening Contexts 
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:      .210***  
     Gender .037 .010  .256***   
     Asian    -.033 .032    -.070   
     BIDRSD .002 .002     .099   
     BIRDIM .007 .001  .332***   
Step 2:    .239* .029 
     Experimental -.022 .010    -.157*   
     LSRPP Centered -.001 .001    -.065   
Step 3:    .219 .011 
   
Experimental_Primary 
 
  .002 
 
.001 
      
      .173 
  
Note: BIDR SD = Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale; BIDR IM = Impression 
Management subscale; LSRPP=Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Primary 
subscale; Experimental_Primary = Interaction term for listening condition x primary 
psychopathy.  
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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Table 12 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Secondary 
Psychopathy Variables predicting Explicit Cognitive Empathy for Listening Contexts 
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:       .212***  
     Gender   .033 .010      .239**   
     Asian -.035 .030 -.080   
    BIDRSD   .003 .002  .119   
    BIRDIM   .006 .001        
.332*** 
  
Step 2:    .236 .024 
     Experimental -.021 .009 -.155*   
     LSRPS Centered .001 .001 .034   
Step 3:    .261* .026 
     
Experimental_Secondary 
  
 .005 
 
.002 
   
.260* 
  
Note: BIDR SD = Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale; BIDR IM = Impression 
Management subscale; LSRPS=Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Secondary 
subscale; Experimental_Secondary = Interaction term for listening condition x secondary 
psychopathy.  
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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Table 13 
Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Primary Psychopathy Variables 
predicting Implicit Affective Empathy for Listening Contexts 
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:    .020  
     Experimental  .275 .149  .139   
     LSRPP Centered .002 .011 .015   
Step 2:    .021 .001 
     
Experimental_Primary 
 
 .011 
 
.023 
 
 .058 
  
Note: LSRPP=Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Primary subscale; 
Experimental_Primary = Interaction term for listening condition x primary psychopathy. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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Table 14 
Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Secondary Psychopathy Variables 
predicting Implicit Affective Empathy for Listening Contexts 
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:    .026  
     Experimental .296 .151   .149*   
     LSRPS Centered .015 .018 .063   
Step 2:    .026 .000 
    
Experiemtnal_Secondary 
 
.008 
 
.036 
.026   
Note LSRPS= Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale-Secondary subscale; 
Experimental_Secondary = Interaction term for listening condition x secondary 
psychopathy. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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Table 15 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Primary Psychopathy  
Variables predicting Explicit Affective Empathy for Listening Contexts 
Note: BIDR SD = Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale; LSRPP=Levenson Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale-Primary subscale; Experimental_Primary = listening condition x 
primary psychopathy.  
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
 
 
  
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:        
.165*** 
 
     Gender .041 .007       .406***   
     Asian   -.009 .023       -.029   
     BIRSD .001 .001 .033   
Step 2:      .189 .024 
     Experimental -.010 .007       -.099   
     LSRPP  -.001 .001       -.114   
Step 3:      .240** .051 
     
Experimental_Primary 
 
 .004 
 
.001 
 
   .389** 
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Table 16 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Demographic and Secondary 
Psychopathy Variables predicting Explicit Affective Empathy for Listening Contexts 
Step and Predictor 
Variables 
 
B SE B β R2 ΔR2 
Step 1:    .170***  
     Gender .042 .007              
.412*** 
  
     Asian       -.009 .023   -.027   
     BIRSD  .000 .001    .028   
Step 2:    .237** .067 
     Listening Condition -.012 .007   -.122   
     LSRPS Centered -.003 .001     .246**   
Step 3:         .259* .023 
     
Experimental_Secondary 
  .004 .002     .538*   
Note: BIDR SD = Self-Deceptive Enhancement subscale; LSRPS= Levenson Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale-Secondary subscale; Experimental_Secondary=Interaction term 
between secondary psychopathy and listening condition.  
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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APPENDIX A 
SCRIPT FOR MALE ANNOUNCER AND KATIE BANKS 
 
Announcer 
Auto accidents continue to kill and mame Americans, but the tragic impact is often lost in 
the cold facts of statistics. Two were killed, 4 injured, and 1 is in critical condition. The 
reality of the tragedy hidden in such statements was brought home recently for Katie 
Banks, a University of Dayton Senior who moved to Kettering with her parents just 2 
years ago. Last month Katie’s parents, Mr. and Mrs. George Banks and her 16-year-old 
sister Jeanette were killed in a head on collision 30 miles south of Cincinnati. They were 
returning to their former home in Cincinnati, Ohio to visit friends. Mr. and Mrs. Banks 
left 3 surviving children; Katie, a senior at UD, Alice, age 11, and Mark, age 8. Katie has 
been given temporary guardianship of her younger brother and sister. Unfortunately, Mr. 
Banks did not carry life insurance and the children were left with very little money. Katie 
is trying desperately to keep her family together and to finish school. She hopes to 
graduate this year but many problems confront her. She does not have enough money for 
groceries or rent, she needs sitters to stay with her brother and sister while she attends her 
classes, and she needs transportation to the grocery store, laundry, and to school since she 
does not have a car. Katie is trying to raise money through private contributions. I talked 
with Katie Banks yesterday; she describes her situation in these words. 
 
 
Katie 
  It … It’s just such a nightmare. I … I just guess I’m still … numb, but I know that life 
has got to go on. The most imp thing for me right now is to… to graduate on time. I .. I 
need to be able to graduate on time and get a good job to support my little brother and 
sister. You know?  (Small sigh) the help that we’ve gotten so far has been really 
wonderful, but we’ve got a long way to go. If we don’t get more help, I’m .. I’m really 
afraid that I’m gonna have to drop out of school … find a job… and that’s just gonna 
make things worse I think, because everybody knows that without a college degree you 
can’t make much money. And if I have to drop out…I’m really afraid that I’m going to 
have to give up the children and I just.. I won’t be able to make enough to support them. 
 
 
Announcer 
Just a look at the problems an accident can cause, even after the immediate shock and 
loss as people try to put their lives back together. This is news, from the personal side.            
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APPENDIX B 
SCRIPT FOR FEMALE ANNOUNCER AND KYLE BANKS 
Announcer 
Auto accidents continue to kill and mame Americans, but the tragic impact is often lost in 
the cold facts of statistics. Two were killed, 4 injured, and 1 is in critical condition. The 
reality of the tragedy hidden in such statements was brought home recently for Kyle 
Banks, a University of Dayton Senior who moved to Kettering with his parents just 2 
years ago. Last month Kyle’s parents, Mr. and Mrs. George Banks and his 16-year-old 
sister Jeanette were killed in a head on collision 30 miles south of Cincinnati. They were 
returning to their former home in Cincinnati, Ohio to visit friends. Mr. and Mrs. Banks 
left 3 surviving children; Kyle, a senior at UD, Alice, age 11, and Mark, age 8. Kyle has 
been given temporary guardianship of his younger brother and sister. Unfortunately, Mr. 
Banks did not carry life insurance and the children were left with very little money. Kyle 
is trying desperately to keep his family together and to finish school. He hopes to 
graduate this year but many problems confront him. He does not have enough money for 
groceries or rent, he needs sitters to stay with his brother and sister while he attends his 
classes, and he needs transportation to the grocery store, laundry, and to school since he 
does not have a car. Kyle is trying to raise money through private contributions. I talked 
with Kyle Banks yesterday; he describes his situation in these words. 
 
 
Katie 
  It … It’s just such a nightmare. I … I just guess I’m still … numb, but I know that life 
has got to go on. The most imp thing for me right now is to… to graduate on time. I .. I 
need to be able to graduate on time and get a good job to support my little brother and 
sister. You know?  (Small sigh) the help that we’ve gotten so far has been really 
wonderful, but we’ve got a long way to go. If we don’t get more help, I’m .. I’m really 
afraid that I’m gonna have to drop out of school … find a job… and that’s just gonna 
make things worse I think, because everybody knows that without a college degree you 
can’t make much money. And if I have to drop out…I’m really afraid that I’m going to 
have to give up the children and I just.. I won’t be able to make enough to support them. 
 
 
Announcer 
Just a look at the problems an accident can cause, even after the immediate shock and 
loss as people try to put their lives back together. This is news, from the personal side.            
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
 
(Control group) 
 
 
 
Instructions  
 
 
Please listen to this audio recording. Just listen. That is, while the audio recording is 
playing, all that we want for you to do is simply sit and listen to what is being said in the 
audio recording. There are not other instructions to be given at this time. 
  
 
 
 
  
85 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
(Experimental, empathy evoking group) 
 
 
 
Instructions  
 
 
While you are listening to this broadcast, try to imagine how the person being 
interviewed feels about what has happened and how it has affected his or her life. Try not 
to concern yourself with attending to all the information presented. Just concentrate on 
trying to imagine how the person interviewed in the broadcast feels. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
READING THE MIND IN THE EYES TEST – REVISED 
 
For each set of eyes, choose and circle which word best describes what the person in the 
picture is thinking or feeling. You may feel that more than one word is applicable but 
please choose just one word, the word which you consider to be most suitable. Before 
making your choice, make sure that you have read all 4 words. You should try to do the 
task as quickly as possible but you will not be timed. If you really don’t know what a 
word means you can look it up in the definition handout. 
 
Record Sheet 
P  jealous  panicked  arrogant  hateful 
 
1  playful  comforting  irritated  bored 
 
2  terrified  upset   arrogant  annoyed 
 
3  joking   flustered  desire   convinced 
 
4  joking   insisting  amused  relaxed 
 
5  irritated  sarcastic  worried  friendly 
 
6  aghast   fantasizing  impatient  alarmed 
 
7  apologetic  friendly  uneasy  dispirited 
 
8  despondent  relieved  shy   excited 
 
9  annoyed  hostile  horrified  preoccupied 
 
10  cautious  insisting  bored   aghast 
 
11  terrified  amused  regretful  flirtatious 
 
12  indifferent  embarrassed  skeptical  dispirited 
 
13  decisive  anticipating  threatening  shy 
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14  irritated  disappointed  depressed  accusing 
 
15  contemplative  flustered  encouraging  amused 
 
16  irritated  thoughtful  encouraging  sympathetic 
 
17  doubtful  affectionate  playful  aghast 
 
18  decisive  amused  aghast   bored 
 
19  arrogant  grateful  sarcastic  tentative 
 
20  dominant  friendly  guilty   horrified 
 
21  embarrassed  fantasizing  confused  panicked 
 
22  preoccupied  grateful  insisting  imploring 
 
23  contented  apologetic  defiant  curious 
 
24  pensive  irritated  excited  hostile 
 
25  panicked  incredulous  despondent  interested 
 
26  alarmed  shy   hostile  anxious 
 
27  joking   cautious  arrogant  reassuring 
 
28  interested  joking   affectionate  contented 
 
29  impatient  aghast   irritated  reflective 
 
30  grateful  flirtatious  hostile  disappointed 
 
31  ashamed  confident  joking   dispirited 
 
32  serious  ashamed  bewildered  alarmed 
 
33  embarrassed  guilty   fantasizing  concerned 
 
34  aghast   baffled  distrustful  terrified
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35  puzzled  nervous  insisting  contemplative 
 
36  ashamed  nervous  suspicious  indecisive 
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Practice 
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1. 
 
2. 
 
 
 
3. 
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4.
 
 
 
5. 
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6. 
 
 
7. 
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8.
 
9. 
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10. 
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11.
12. 
 
13. 
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14. 
 
15. 
 
 
 
  
97 
 
 
16. 
 
17. 
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18.
 
 
19. 
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20. 
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21.
 
 
22.
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23.
 
24.
25.
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26.
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27.
 
28.
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29.
 
30.
 
 
 
 
  
105 
 
31.
 
32.
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33.
 
34.
 
35. 
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36. 
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Answers: 
P – panicked 
1. – playful 
2. – upset 
3. – desire 
4. – insisting 
5. – worried  
6. – fantasizing 
7. – uneasy 
8. – despondent 
9. – preoccupied 
10. – cautious 
11. – regretful 
12. – skeptical 
13. – anticipating 
14. – accusing 
15. – contemplative 
16. – thoughtful 
17. – doubtful 
18. – decisive 
19. – tentative 
20. – friendly 
21. – fantasizing 
22. – preoccupied 
23. – defiant 
24. – pensive 
25. – interested 
26. – hostile 
27. – cautious 
28. – interested 
29. – reflective 
30. – flirtatious 
31. – confident 
32. – serious 
33. – concerned 
34. – distrustful 
35. – nervous 
36. – suspicious 
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APPENDIX F 
INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX 
 
The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of 
situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate 
letter on the scale at the top of the page:  A, B, C, D, or E. When you have decided on 
your answer, fill in the letter on the answer sheet next to the item number. READ EACH 
ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can. Thank 
you. 
 
ANSWER SCALE: 
 
 A               B               C               D               E 
 DOES NOT                                                     DESCRIBES ME 
 DESCRIBE ME                                                 VERY WELL 
 WELL                                                                
 
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me. 
____ (FS) 
 
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. ____ (EC) 
 
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. ____ 
(PT) RS 
 
4. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
____ (EC) RS 
 
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. ____ (FS) 
 
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. ____ (PD) 
 
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely 
caught up in it. ____ (FS) RS 
 
8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. ____ (PT) 
 
 
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. 
____ (EC) 
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10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. ____ 
(PD) 
 
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective. ____ (PT) 
 
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. 
____ (FS) RS 
 
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. ____ (PD) RS 
 
14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. ____ (EC) RS 
 
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other 
people's arguments. ____ (PT) RS 
 
16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. ____ 
(FS) 
 
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. ____ (PD) 
 
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them. ____ (EC) RS 
 
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. ____ (PD) RS 
 
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. ____ (EC) 
 
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. ____ 
(PT) 
 
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. ____ (EC) 
 
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
       character. ____ (FS) 
 
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. ____ (PD) 
 
25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. 
____ (PT) 
 
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me. ____ (FS) 
 
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. ____ 
(PD) 
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28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
____ (PT) 
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APPENDIX G 
TRAIT EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONNAIRE – SHORT FORM 
 
Please answer each statement below by putting a circle around the number that best 
reflects your degree of agreement or disagreement with that statement. Do not think too 
long about the exact meaning of the statements. Work quickly and try to answer as 
accurately as possible. There are no right or wrong answers. There are seven possible 
responses to each statement ranging from ‘Completely Disagree’ (number 1) to 
‘Completely Agree’ (number 7). 
 
1 . . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . . . 3 . . . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Complete Disagree       Completely Agree  
 
1. Expressing my emotions with words is not a problem for me.             1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(E) 
 
2. I often find it difficult to see things from another person’s viewpoint.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(E) RS 
 
3. On the whole, I’m a highly motivated person.                1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
4. I usually find it difficult to regulate my emotions.                                    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S-C) RS 
 
5. I generally don’t find life enjoyable.      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(W) RS 
 
6. I can deal effectively with people.       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S) 
 
7. I tend to change my mind frequently.      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S-C) RS 
 
8. Many times, I can’t figure out what emotion I'm feeling.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(E) RS 
 
9. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(W) 
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10. I often find it difficult to stand up for my rights.     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S) RS 
 
11. I’m usually able to influence the way other people feel.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S) 
 
12. On the whole, I have a gloomy perspective on most things.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(W) RS 
 
13. Those close to me often complain that I don’t treat them right.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(E) RS 
 
14. I often find it difficult to adjust my life according to the circumstances. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
RS 
 
15. On the whole, I’m able to deal with stress.     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S-C) 
 
16. I often find it difficult to show my affection to those close to me.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(E) RS 
 
17. I’m normally able to “get into someone’s shoes” and experience their 
emotions. (E)         1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
18. I normally find it difficult to keep myself motivated.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
RS 
 
19. I’m usually able to find ways to control my emotions when I want to.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S-C) 
 
20. On the whole, I’m pleased with my life.      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(W) 
 
21. I would describe myself as a good negotiator.     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S) 
 
22. I tend to get involved in things I later wish I could get out of.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S-C) RS 
 
23. I often pause and think about my feelings.     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(E) 
 
24. I believe I’m full of personal strengths.      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(W) 
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25. I tend to “back down” even if I know I’m right.     1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S) RS 
 
26. I don’t seem to have any power at all over other people’s feelings.  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S) RS 
 
27. I generally believe that things will work out fine in my life.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(W) 
 
28. I find it difficult to bond well even with those close to me.   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(E) RS 
 
29. Generally, I’m able to adapt to new environments.    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
30. Others admire me for being relaxed.      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(S-C)
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APPENDIX H 
LEVENSON SELF-REPORT PSYCHOPATHY SCALE (LSRP) 
Please answer the following questions using the scale below: 
1= Disagree strongly 
2= Disagree somewhat 
3= Agree somewhat 
4= Agree strongly 
 
 
Primary Psychopathy 
 
_____ 1. Success is based on survival of the fittest; I am not concerned about  
the losers. 
 
_____ 2. For me, what’s right is whatever I can get away with. 
 
_____ 3. In today’s world, I feel justified in doing anything I can get away with to  
succeed. 
_____ 4. My main purpose in life is getting as many goodies as I can. 
 
_____ 5. Making a lot of money is my most important goal. 
 
_____ 6. I let others worry about higher values; my main concern is with the  
bottom line. 
 
_____ 7. People who are stupid enough to get ripped off usually deserve it. 
 
_____ 8. Looking out for myself is my top priority. 
 
_____ 9. I tell other people what they want to hear so that they will do what I  
want them to do. 
 
_____ 10. I would be upset if my success came at someone else’s expense. RS 
 
_____ 11. I often admire a really clever scam. 
 
_____ 12. I make a point of trying not to hurt others in pursuit of my goals. RS
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_____ 13. I enjoy manipulating other people’s feelings. 
 
_____ 14. I feel bad if my words or actions cause someone to feel emotional  
pain. RS 
 
_____ 15. Even if I were trying very hard to sell something, I wouldn’t lie about it. RS 
_____ 16. Cheating is not justified because it is unfair to others. RS 
 
 
Secondary Psychopathy 
 
_____ 1. I find myself in the same kinds of trouble, time after time. 
 
_____ 2. I am often bored. 
 
_____ 3. I find that I am able to pursue one goal for a long time. RS 
 
_____ 4. I don’t plan anything very far in advance. 
 
_____ 5. I quickly lose interest in tasks I start. 
 
_____ 6. Most of my problems are due to the fact that other people just don’t  
understand me. 
 
_____ 7. Before I do anything, I carefully consider the possible consequences. RS 
 
_____ 8. I have been in a lot of shouting matches with other people. 
 
_____ 9. When I get frustrated, I often “let off steam” by blowing my top. 
 
_____ 10. Love is overrated. 
 
 
RS denotes reverse score items 
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APPENDIX I 
PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY INVENTORY – REVISED 
 This test measures different personality characteristics- that is, the ways in which 
people’s personality styles make them different from each other. Read each statement 
carefully and decide how false or true it is as a description of you. Then, mark the best 
choice that corresponds to your answer on this form. Use the answer choices provided as 
follows: F = False(1), MF = Mostly False(2), MT = Mostly True(3), T = True(4). 
Even if you feel that a statement is neither false nor true about you, or if you are not sure 
which answer to choose, select the answer that is the closest to describing you. Try to be 
as honest as you can. Please be sure to give your own opinion about whether each 
statement is false or true about you. Remember, you have the right to leave any and/or all 
of the questions blank. 
    
        1 2 3 4 
1. If I really want to, I can persuade most people of  F MF MT T 
 almost anything. (ME) 
 
2. When I meet people, I can often make them interested F MF MT T 
 in me with just one smile. (SOI) 
 
3. Dangerous activities like skydiving scare me more than  F MF MT T 
 they do most people. RS (F) 
 
4. I have always seen myself as something of a rebel. (RN) F MF MT T 
 
5. I hate having to tell people bad news. RS  (C)  F MF MT T 
 
6. Sometimes I wake up feeling nervous without   F MF MT T 
 knowing why. RS – S.I. 
 
7. I like to act first and think later. (CN)   F MF MT T 
 
8. Sometimes I forget my name.(DR)    F MF MT T 
  
9. At times, I worry that I have hurt the feelings of others. F MF MT T 
 RS (C) 
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10. I am easily flustered in pressured situations. RS – S.I. F MF MT T 
 
11. I tell a lot of “white lies.” (ME)    F MF MT T 
  
12. I would find the job of a movie stunt person exciting. (F)F MF MT T 
 
13. When my life gets boring, I like to take chances. (F)  F MF MT
 T 
  
14. I’ve never cared about society’s “values of right   F MF MT T 
 and wrong.” (RN) 
 
15. I might like to hang out with people who “drift” from  F MF MT T 
 city to city with no permanent home. (RN) 
 
16. If I’d had fewer bad breaks in life, I’d be more  F MF MT T 
 successful. (BE) 
 
17. It would bother me to cheat on a test even if no one   F MF MT T 
 was hurt by it. RS (ME) 
 
18. A lot of people have tried to “stab me in the back.”(BE)F MF MT T 
  
19. People’s reactions to the things I do often are not what F MF MT T 
 I would expect. (BE) 
 
20. On big holidays, I never eat more than I should.(VR)  F MF MT
 T 
  
21. I find it hard to make small talk with people I don’t  F MF MT T 
 know well. RS (SOI) 
 
22. I’m not good at getting people to do favors for me. RS (SOI)  F MF MT
 T 
  
23. I get mad if I don’t receive special favors I deserve. (ME)F MF MT T 
 
24. I am hardly ever the center of attention. RS (SOI)  F MF MT
 T 
 
25. It might be exciting to be on a plane that was about  F MF MT T 
 to crash but somehow landed safely. (F) 
 
26. I pride myself on being offbeat and different from  F MF MT T 
others. (RN) 
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27. A lot of times, I worry when a friend is having   F MF MT T 
 personal problems. RS (C) 
 
28. I tend to get crabby and irritable when I have too F MF MT T 
 many things to do. RS – S.I. (STI) 
 
29. A lot of times, I repeat the same bad decisions. (CN) F MF MT T 
  
30. I think that it should be against the law to badly   F MF MT T 
 injure someone on purpose. RS (DR) 
 
31. I get mad when I hear about the injustices in the world. F MF MT T 
 RS (C) 
 
32. I don’t let everyday hassles get on my nerves. S.I. F MF MT T 
 
33. I could be a good “con artist.” (ME)   F MF MT T 
 
34. I have a talent for getting people to talk to me. (SOI) F MF MT T 
 
35. I like (or would like) to play sports with a lot of   F MF MT T 
 physical contact. (F) 
 
36. I might like to travel around the country with some  F MF MT T 
 motorcyclists and cause trouble. (RN) 
 
37. I have never wished harm on someone else. (VR)  F MF MT
 T 
  
38. People usually give me the credit that I have coming F MF MT T 
 to me. RS(BE) 
 
39. If I want to, I can get people to do what I want without F MF MT T 
 them ever knowing. (ME) 
 
40. When I’m with people who do something wrong, I  F MF MT T 
 usually get the blame. (BE) 
 
41. People are impressed with me after they first meet me. (SOI) F MF MT T 
 
42. I have no bad habits. (VR)    F MF MT T 
  
43. In conversations, I’m the one who does most of the F MF MT T 
 talking. (SOI) 
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44. I try to be the best at everything I do. RS (CN)  F MF MT T 
 
 
F(1) = False, MF(2) = Mostly False, MT(3) = Mostly True, T(4) = True 
 
45. To be honest, I believe that I am more important  F MF MT T 
 than most people. (ME) 
 
46. I feel sure of myself when I’m around other people. (SOI) F MF MT T 
 
47. Parachute jumping would really scare me. RS (F)  F MF MT T 
  
48. I’d like to spend my life writing poetry in a commune. (RN) F MF MT T 
 
49. I look out for myself before I look out for anyone else. (C) F MF MT T 
 
50. I am high-strung. RS – S.I.    F MF MT T 
  
51. When people lend me something, I try to get it back F MF MT T 
 to them quickly. RS (CN) 
 
52. Whenever I hear an airplane flying above me, I look F MF MT T 
 down at the ground. (DR) 
 
53. I often feel guilty about small things. RS (C)  F MF MT T 
 
54. When I’m in a frightening situation, I can “turn off” F MF MT T 
 my fear almost at will. S.I. 
 
55. I’ll break a promise if it’s too hard to keep (ME) F MF MT T 
 
56. I like to stand out in a crowd. (SOI)   F MF MT T 
 
57. It would be fun to fly a small airplane by myself. (F) F MF MT T 
  
58. I like to dress differently from other people. (RN) F MF MT T 
 
59. Every once in a while, I nod my head when people  F MF MT T 
 speak to me even though I’m not paying attention 
 to them. RS (VR) 
 
60. People “rake me over the coals” for no good reason. (BE)F MF MT T 
  
61. In school or at work, I try to “stretch” the rules just F MF MT T 
 to see what I can get away with. (ME) 
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62. I’ve often been betrayed by people I trusted. (BE) F MF MT T 
  
63. The opposite sex finds me sexy and appealing.(SOI)  F MF MT T 
 
64. I have never pretended to know something I didn’t  F MF MT T 
 know. (VR) 
 
65. I have a hard time standing up for my rights. RS (SOI) F MF MT T 
  
66. When a task gets too hard, I’ll drop it and move on  F MF MT T 
to something else. (CN) 
67. I enjoy seeing someone I don’t like get into trouble.(ME)F MF MT T 
 
68. I get embarrassed more easily than most people. RS (SOI)F MF MT T 
 
69. High places make me nervous. RS (F)   F MF MT T 
 
70. I get restless when my life gets too predictable.(RN) F MF MT T 
 
71. It would break my heart to see a poor or homeless F MF MT T 
 person walking the streets at night. RS (C) 
 
72. Some people say that I am a “worry wart.” RS – S.I. F MF MT T 
 
73. I like having my vacations planned out. RS (CN) F MF MT T 
 
74. I smile at a funny joke at least once in a while. RS (DR)F MF MT T 
 
75. It bothers me a lot when I see someone crying. RS (C) F MF MT T 
 
76. I get stressed out when I’m “juggling” too many tasks. F MF MT T 
 RS – S.I. 
 
77. I like to (or would like to) wear expensive and   F MF MT T 
 “showy” clothing. (ME) 
 
 
78. It’s easy for me to go up to a stranger and introduce F MF MT T 
 myself.(SOI) 
 
79. I would not like to be a race-car driver. RS(F)  F MF MT T 
 
80. I don’t care about following the “rules”; I make my F MF MT T 
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 own rules as I go along. (RN) 
 
F(1) = False, MF(2) = Mostly False, MT(3) = Mostly True, T(4) = True 
 
81. I never give an opinion unless I’ve thought it over  F MF MT T 
 carefully. (VR) 
 
82. Few people in my life have taken advantage of me. RS(BE)  F MF MT
 T 
  
83. I don’t take advantage of people even when it would F MF MT T 
 be good for me. RS (ME) 
 
84. I’ve been the victim of a lot of bad luck. (BE)  F MF MT T 
 
85. When people are mad at me, I usually win them over F MF MT T 
 with my charm. (SOI) 
 
86. I sometimes put off unpleasant tasks. RS  (VR)  F MF MT T 
 
87. I’m hardly ever the “life of the party.” RS (SOI) F MF MT T 
 
88. I am careful when I do work that involves detail. RS (CN)F MF MT T 
  
89. I’ve thought a lot about my long-term career goals. RS (CN)F MF MT T 
  
90. Some people have gone out of their way to make my  F MF MT T 
 life difficult. (BE) 
 
91. I would make a good actor. (SOI)   F MF MT T 
 
92. I sometimes lie just to see if I can get someone to  F MF MT T 
 believe me. (ME) 
 
93. I agree with the motto, “If you are bored with life, F MF MT T 
 risk it.” (F) 
 
94. If I had grown up during the 1960s, I would have  F MF MT T 
 been a “hippie.” (RN) 
 
95. I can honestly say that I’ve never met anyone I   F MF MT T 
 disliked. (VR) 
 
96. I function well under stress. S.I.    F MF MT T 
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97. I feel bad about myself after I tell a lie. RS (C)   F MF MT T 
 
98. I get deeply attached to people I like. RS (C)  F MF MT T 
  
F(1) = False, MF(2) = Mostly False, MT(3) = Mostly True, T(4) = True 
 
99. People who know me well know they can depend F MF MT T 
 and rely on me. RS(CN) 
 
100. I feel that life has treated me fairly. RS(BE)    F MF MT
 T 
  
101. If I do something that gets me in trouble, I don’t F MF MT T 
 do it again. RS(CN) 
 
102. I frequently have disturbing thoughts that become F MF MT T 
 so powerful that I think I can hear claps of thunder 
or crashes of cymbals inside my head. (DR) 
 
103. I have to admit that I’m a bit of a materialist. (ME) F MF MT T 
 
104. I like my life to be unpredictable and surprising. (RN) F MF MT T 
  
105. I like to poke fun at established traditions.(RN)  F MF MT T 
  
106. I occasionally feel like giving up on difficult tasks.  F MF MT T 
 RS(VR) 
  
107. When I’m stressed, I often see big, red, rectangular F MF MT T 
 shapes moving in front of my eyes. (DR) 
 
108. I push myself as hard as I can when I’m working. RS(CN)F MF MT T 
  
109. I get very upset when I see photographs of starving F MF MT T 
 people. RS(C) 
 
110. Ending a friendship is (or would be) very painful F MF MT T 
 for me. RS(C) 
 
111. I haven’t thought much about what I want to do  F MF MT T 
 with my life. (CN) 
 
112. I’m sure some people would be pleased to see me  F MF MT T 
 fail in my life. (BE) 
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113. I hardly ever end up being the leader of a group. RS(SOI) F MF MT T 
  
114. I often lose patience with people when I have to  F MF MT T 
 keep explaining things. (ME) 
 
 
F(1) = False, MF(2) = Mostly False, MT(3) = Mostly True, T(4) = True 
 
115. I might like flying across the ocean in a hot-air  F MF MT T 
 balloon. (F) 
 
116. Many people see my political beliefs as “radical.” (RN)F MF MT T 
 
117. I occasionally feel annoyed at people. RS(VR)  F MF MT T 
 
118. I don’t get nervous under pressure. S.I.    F MF MT T 
  
119. I worry about things even when there’s no reason to. F MF MT T 
 RS – S.I. 
 
120. I do favors for people even when I know I won’t F MF MT T 
 see them again. RS(C)  
  
121. When I am doing something important, like taking  F MF MT T 
 a test or doing my taxes, I check it over first. RS(CN) 
 
122. People I thought were my “friends” have gotten F MF MT T 
 me into trouble. (BE) 
 
123. I often put off doing fun things so I can finish my F MF MT T 
 work. RS(CN)  
 
124. When an important person is talking to me, I usually F MF MT T 
 try to pay attention. RS(DR) 
 
125. How much I like someone really depends on how F MF MT T 
 much that person does for me.(ME) 
 
126. Sometimes I do dangerous things on a dare. (F) F MF MT T 
  
127. Keeping the same job for most of my life would F MF MT T 
 be dull. (RN) 
 
128. I occasionally have bad thoughts about people who  F MF MT T 
 hurt my feelings. RS(VR) 
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129. When a friend says hello to me, I generally either  F MF MT T 
 wave or say something back. RS(DR) 
 
130. I think long and hard before I make big decisions. RS(CN)F MF MT T 
  
 
F(1) = False, MF(2) = Mostly False, MT(3) = Mostly True, T(4) = True 
 
131. When someone is hurt by something I say or do,   F MF MT T 
that’s their problem.(C) 
 
132. I tell people only the part of the truth they want to F MF MT T 
 hear.(ME) 
 
133. I’ve learned from my big mistakes in life. RS(CN)   F MF MT
 T 
  
134. I get blamed for many things that aren’t my fault.(BE) 
 F MF MT T 
  
135. It bothers me to talk in front of a big group of   F MF MT T 
strangers. RS(SOI) 
 
136. I quickly get annoyed with people who do not give F MF MT T 
 me what I want. (ME) 
  
137. If I were a firefighter, I would like the thrill of saving  F MF MT T 
 someone from the top of a burning building.(F) 
 
138. I would like to have a “wild” hairstyle. (RN)  F MF MT T 
  
139. Even when I’m busy, I never have second thoughts F MF MT T 
 about helping people who ask for favors. (VR) 
 
140. I can remain calm in situations that would make   F MF MT T 
 many other people panic. S.I. 
 
141. I’m the kind of person who gets “stressed out”   F MF MT T 
 pretty easily. RS – S.I. 
 
142. I cringe when an athlete gets badly injured during F MF MT T 
 a game on TV. RS(C) 
 
143. I usually think about what I’m going to say before F MF MT T 
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 I say it. RS(CN) 
 
144. Some people have made up stories about me to get  F MF MT T 
 me in trouble. (BE) 
 
145. I watch my finances closely. RS(CN)   F MF MT T  
 
146. During the day, I see the world in color rather   F MF MT T 
 than in black-and-white. RS(DR) 
 
F(1) = False, MF(2) = Mostly False, MT(3) = Mostly True, T(4) = True 
 
147. To be honest, I try not to help people unless   F MF MT T 
 there’s something in it for me.(ME) 
 
148. I am a daredevil. (F)     F MF MT T 
 
149. I would like to hitchhike across the country with  F MF MT T 
 no plans.(RN) 
 
150. I have never exaggerated a story to make it sound F MF MT T 
 more interesting. (VR) 
 
151. Sometimes I go for several days at a time not  F MF MT T 
 knowing if I’m awake or asleep. (DR) 
 
152. I try to use my best manners when I’m around   F MF MT T 
 other people. RS(CN) 
 
153. I often place my friends’ needs above my own. RS(C) F MF MT T 
 
 
154. If I can’t change the rules, I try to get others to   F MF MT T 
 bend them for me. (ME) 
 
RS denotes reverse score items. 
S.I. denotes Stress Immunity Scale items that will be removed upon scoring 
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APPENDIX J 
STATE-TRAIT ANXIETY INVENTORY 
 A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given 
below. Read each statement and then circle the appropriate value to the right of the 
statement to indicate how you generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do 
not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to 
describe how you generally feel. Remember, you have the right to leave any and/or all of 
the questions blank. 
 
 
 
    Almost Never     Sometimes     Often     Almost Always 
1. I feel pleasant RS   1  2      3  4 
2. I feel nervous and restless  1  2      3  4 
3. I feel satisfied with myself RS 1  2      3  4 
4. I wish I could be as happy  1  2      3  4 
 as others seem to be 
 
5. I feel like a failure   1  2      3  4 
 
6. I feel rested RS   1  2      3  4 
 
7. I am “calm, cool, and collected”    1  2      3  4 
RS 
8. I feel that difficulties are piling 1  2      3  4 
 up so that I cannot 
 overcome them 
 
9. I worry too much over something 1  2      3  4 
 that really doesn’t matter 
 
10. I am happy RS   1  2      3  4 
 
11. I have disturbing thoughts 1  2      3  4 
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12. I lack self-confidence  1  2      3  4  
   
13. I feel secure RS   1  2      3  4 
 
14. I make decisions easily RS 1  2      3  4  
 
15. I feel inadequate   1  2      3  4 
 
16. I am content RS   1  2      3  4 
 
17. Some unimportant thought runs 1  2      3  4 
 through my mind and  
 bothers me 
 
18. I take disappointments so keenly  1  2      3  4 
 that I can’t put them out of  
 my mind 
 
19. I am a steady person RS  1  2      3  4 
 
20. I get in a state of tension or  1  2      3  4 
 turmoil as I think over my  
 recent concerns and interests 
 
RS denotes reverse score items. 
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APPENDIX K 
BALANCED INVENTORY OF DESIRABLE RESPONDING 
 Using the scale of 1 to 7 below, write a number beside each statement to indicate 
how much you agree with it. Remember, you have the right to leave any and/or all of the 
questions blank. 
 
 Strongly_______________________________________________Strongly 
 Disagree        Agree 
 1                 2                  3                4                 5                 6                 7 
 
 
Self-Deceptive Enhancement Scale 
 
_____ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.  
 
_____ 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits. RS  
 
_____ 3. I don’t care to know what people really think of me.  
 
_____ 4. I have not always been honest with myself. RS  
 
_____ 5. I always know why I like things.  
 
_____ 6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking. RS  
 
_____ 7. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion. 
 
_____ 8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit. RS  
 
_____ 9. I am fully in control of my own fate.  
 
_____ 10. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought. RS  
 
_____ 11. I never regret my decisions.  
 
_____ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon 
 enough. RS  
 
_____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference 
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_____ 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me. RS  
 
_____ 15. I am a completely rational person.  
 
_____ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism. RS  
 
_____ 17. I am very confident of my judgments.  
 
_____ 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover. RS  
 
_____ 19. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.  
 
_____ 20. I don’t always know the reasons why I like to do things. RS  
 
 
Impression Management Scale 
 
_____ 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to. RS  
 
_____ 22. I never cover up my mistakes.  
 
_____ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. RS  
 
_____ 24. I never swear.  
 
_____ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. RS  
 
_____ 26. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught.  
 
_____ 27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back. RS  
 
_____ 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.  
 
_____ 29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or 
 her. RS  
_____ 30. I always declare everything at customs.  
 
_____ 31. When I was young I sometimes stole things. RS  
 
 
_____ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street.  
 
_____ 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit. RS  
 
_____ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines.  
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_____ 35. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about. RS  
 
_____ 36. I never take things that don’t belong to me.  
 
 _____ 37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick. 
RS   
 _____ 38. I have never damaged a library book or stole merchandise without reporting it.  
 
_____ 39. I have some pretty awful habits. RS  
 
_____ 40. I don’t gossip about other people’s business.  
 
RS denotes reverse score items (Award 1 point for each “6” or “7” responses and 0 points 
for any other response) 
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APPENDIX L 
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET 
Please take a few moments to complete the demographic information on this page and 
then proceed in completing the remainder of the assessment packet in the order in which 
the questionnaires are presented. 
 
 
Participant Number_______________ 
Age: ________ 
Gender: Male Female 
Ethnicity: _____________________ 
Year in School: Freshman Sophomore Junior       Senior 
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APPENDIX M 
WORD SEARCH PUZZLE 
 
